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1. Introduction and background
Academics and practitioners alike are nowadays arriving 
at the same conclusion: corruption cannot be effectively 
controlled without civil society involvement. As one of the 
most eminent scholars in corruption remarked: “Corruption 
will continue – indeed, may well be the norm - until those 
with a stake in ending it are able to oppose it in ways that 
cannot be ignored” (Johnston 2014, 1).
The practical implication of that statement is that social 
accountability initiatives can play a critical role in fighting 
corruption. The end goal is to make local public officials 
directly accountable to the communities they serve, which 
requires the involvement of citizens in performing certain 
activities, such as quality assessment and monitoring, in 
order to generate actionable inputs for deterring corruption 
and improving development outcomes. Many mechanisms 
have been developed through which citizens and communi-
ties can become engaged,1 reflecting not only the growing 
interest in this approach, but also the vast potential in terms 
of sectors and governance outcomes upon which citizen 
participation is expected to generate a positive change.
There is evidence to suggest that social accountability has 
greatest potential to effect positive improvements in the 
delivery of essential services. The premise is that corrup-
tion in areas such as health, security and education carries 
the highest social costs and that those directly affected by 
it are in the best position to accurately evaluate the extent 
and gravity of the problem and to generate precise and ac-
tionable information about it. 
We believe social accountability can be an effective tool 
against corruption, one that can empower citizens and pro-
mote responsive behaviours from public officials and ulti-
mately have a clear impact on improving people’s lives. With 
this conviction, the Basel Institute on Governance and UN-
DP’s Global Programme on Anti-Corruption (PACDE) have 
joined efforts to develop an assessment framework and 
methodology that capture the main elements that play a role 
1 A good list and description of different social accountability tools can be 
found in (UNDP 2010).
in enabling the success of social accountability initiatives. 
Based on recent research findings these elements would be: 
promoting changes in both supply and demand, address-
ing problems that are perceived as important and highly 
significant by the actors involved, and building upon local-
ly legitimate accountability mechanisms (O’Meally 2013). 
The assessment builds upon those findings and on our own 
research focusing on local attributes such as institutional 
trust, social capital, community values and norms. While 
maintaining academic rigor, the assessment has been elab-
orated with the goal of making its empirical applicability 
as straightforward as possible, providing guidance on how 
to match the characteristics of the intended beneficiary 
communities to appropriate social accountability tools and 
approaches in order to promote a “good fit” and maximize 
effectiveness and sustainability.
The assessment framework and toolkit are meant to be in-
struments to support ongoing anti-corruption social account-
ability initiatives; the methodology is intended to generate 
suggestions for improved project design as well as indicators 
to help implementers track project progress and impact.
The information required to carry out this assessment is 
obtained by applying three research tools: a) a survey on 
institutional trust, social values and practices, b) focus group 
discussions with groups of citizens that have been exposed 
to the social accountability intervention on the one hand 
and a control group on the other, and c) semi-structured 
interviews with local government officials, service providers 
and civil society organizations (CSOs). These tools can be 
tailored according to the sector in which the social account-
ability initiative is being implemented and to better reflect 
the characteristics of the local context. This assessment 
can usefully be applied at the outset of the social account-
ability intervention in order to generate a baseline data set, 
and then be re-applied later on in order to measure prog-
ress and impact. 
The approach presented here addresses two of the most 
important recognized challenges to social accountability 
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approaches: lack of a clear underlying theory of change 
and inadequate contextualization to local characteristics 
and needs (Evans et al. 1996; Bossert 1998; Gershberg 
1998; A. Joshi 2007). 
The first challenge demands clarity about the assumed 
causality that leads from citizen participation to decreased 
corruption. This is an element that has not always been 
clearly stated. Often the advantages of social accountabil-
ity schemes are framed in the literature in terms such as: 
“overcoming biases of elite domination, better informed 
officials and citizens with stronger dispositions and skills, 
greater justice of policy and effectiveness” (Fung 2003). 
These kinds of statements stress the intended goals without 
making an explicit argument about the intervening process 
that generates actual change. Other authors state that in-
creased participation “should contribute towards certain 
forms of coordination, thereby facilitating development” 
(Coehlo & Favareto 2008, pp.18–19), which still remains 
vague and lacks explanatory potential. The underlying prob-
lem is that, as a recent review of accountability initiatives 
stated, “many initiatives are focused at increasing trans-
parency and amplifying voice, without examining the link 
of these with accountability and ultimately responsiveness” 
(Anuradha Joshi 2010).
This assessment tool incorporates and addresses this chal-
lenge as it is based upon an analytical framework which 
identifies the key elements that need to be present in or-
der to maximize the potential for success of any social ac-
countability initiative. This analytical framework, which is 
described in Section 2, conceptualizes social accountability 
in the form of a cycle involving interactions between citi-
zens, government decision makers and service providers. 
It emphasizes the importance of linking up citizens’ inputs 
to state actors with the goal of developing monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms that establish links between the 
incentives of providers of public services and citizens’ satis-
faction with the quality of the services provided. Therefore, 
citizens’ actions can provide vital information on the preva-
lence of corrupt practices in the public sector which, once 
made available to those who have the ability to act upon it 
and enforce sanctions, can lead to a reduced opportunity 
space for the abuse of public resources for private gain. 
Without addressing the need of effectively engaging state 
actors in any initiative involving participatory actions, it is 
not possible to develop approaches through which citizens 
can be empowered to actually hold state actors accountable. 
The second challenge relates to the inconsistent track re-
cord of the effectiveness of social accountability approach-
es as revealed by available empirical evidence (McGee and 
Gaventa 2010, p.22) (Gaventa and Barrett 2010, 14). Some 
authors have even suggested that the importance of foster-
ing social accountability initiatives to improve governance in 
the delivery of basic services has been overstated (D. Booth 
2011), and that in fact these participatory mechanisms have 
little impact on accountability (Andrews and Shah 2002). 
While acknowledging the challenges involved in properly 
operationalizing participatory interventions, we believe it 
is not possible to ignore the existing evidence that social 
accountability initiatives, when adequately designed and im-
plemented, can make a meaningful contribution to combat 
corruption and improve the livelihoods of people. Evidence 
from Uganda (Björkman & Svensson 2010), Brazil (Centre 
for the Future State 2007, Cornwall & Shankland 2008), 
India (United Nations 2007) and Afghanistan (Schouten 
2011), to name a few, highlights the feasibility and potential 
of social accountability. 
A shared insight that the success stories reveal is that it 
is key to develop initiatives that are adequate to and con-
sistent with the context in which they are implemented, so 
that they may be easily undertaken by citizens as well as 
sustainable. As a renowned group of social accountability 
practitioners forcefully put it: “a blind infatuation with social 
accountability tools without an understanding of the context 
leads to disastrous and wasteful consequences” (Affiliated 
Network for Social Accountability 2010).
We are convinced that understanding the particular char-
acteristics of different societies is essential to optimize the 
success of social accountability initiatives. This assessment 
10
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Section 7 provides systematized guidelines to match con-
textual variations to specific approaches across all social 
accountability program components. Examples of the al-
ternative approaches as well as their relative strengths and 
weaknesses are discussed. In this section three of the most 
widely used social accountability mechanisms – namely 
Participatory Budgeting, Citizen Report Cards and Citizen 
Scorecards – are presented for informative purposes.   
Section 8 presents lessons learned. 
Detailed methodological notes, as well as a generic version 
of all the research and analysis tools that are required to 
conduct the assessment are presented in the Annex.
represents the first systematic effort to develop a tool that 
can generate information about critical attributes of com-
munities targeted for social accountability interventions. 
The elements that are key for contextualization are derived 
from a model of the relationship between service providers 
and citizens which is contingent on elements such as citi-
zens’ self perceptions, capacity for collective action among 
community members and the incentive structure faced by 
service providers. This model is presented in Section 3.
Section 4, 5 and 6 present the results from our application 
of the assessment methodology to three cases of ongoing 
social accountability initiatives in Serbia, the Philippines and 
Ghana, which have been supported by PACDE. The Serbian 
case refers to an intervention in the health sector in Bel-
grade, the Philippines case involves the agriculture sector 
in San Miguel, Bohol and in Ghana the social accountability 
project targeted the health sector in several communities 
in Ajumako and Jasikan districts.2
2 Field research conducted in Belgrade, Serbia, during the months of July 
and August 2013; in San Miguel, Bohol, the Philippines during the month 
of July 2013; and in three communities, Ajumako-Bisease, Ajumako-Ku-
masi, both in the Ajumako district, and Teteman in the Volta region 
Jasikan District, Ghana, during the month of August 2013. The same 
methodology was applied across all three cases.
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This framework is based on the proposition that social ac-
countability involves three core elements: voice, enforceabil-
ity and answerability, which together form part of a cycle.
Voice here is understood as a variety of mechanisms – 
formal and informal – through which people express their 
preferences, opinions and views and demand accountability 
from power-holders (UNDP 2010, 11).
The concept of voice distinguishes itself from a simple col-
lection of complaints or comments through the following 
three characteristics:
At the core of the social accountability concept lays the 
relationship between citizens and the providers of pub-
lic services. The ultimate goal is, through structured and 
meaningful participation of citizens, to develop this rela-
tionship into one where entitlements are realized, quality of 
service provision improved and, ultimately, citizen welfare 
is advanced. In order to achieve this goal, the premise of 
social accountability is to enable an environment in which 
citizens exercise their voice and service providers are an-
swerable to them. 
A formal conceptual framework upon which this assessment 
is formulated is depicted in Figure 1.
2. Formal components of social 
accountability
Source: Baez Camargo and Jacobs, 2013.
Figure 1: Components and steps involved in effecitve social accountability initiatives	  
Citizens/Users 
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Providers 
Government decision makers 
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Opinion 
Transmission 
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First, for citizens to effectively participate in monitoring and 
evaluating any aspect of public sector performance, they 
need to have a clear understanding of what the mandate is. 
In other words, citizens may very well not even be aware of 
their rights and entitlements and of the specific obligations 
that public officers have to fulfil in the course of their work. 
For this reason capacity building, understood minimally as 
sharing basic information on mandate, rights and entitle-
ments with citizens who are to perform social accountabil-
ity activities, can be deemed to be a first prerequisite for 
voice to be effective.
Second, the evaluations and opinions that result from social 
accountability activities need to be aggregated and articulat-
ed. Most importantly, the information resulting from the pro-
cess of aggregating and articulating citizens’ assessments, 
opinions and complaints should be formulated in direct ref-
erence to the mandate highlighting specific shortcomings, 
unmet targets and, in the case of complaints, synthetizing 
individual grievances into actionable demands.
Third, generating information is not enough. Citizen-gen-
erated information needs to be transmitted to the relevant 
actors or decision makers who can act upon it and/or for 
whom the information has the potential to generate costs. 
In other words, aggregating and articulating information is 
not sufficient unless it is channelled in a way that it can 
have an effect on the incentive structures of decision mak-
ers and public officials. 
Enforceability refers to a situation where, in case the man-
date is not appropriately fulfilled, consequences are expect-
ed ensue. Enforceability is a critical underlying factor shaping 
the incentives of service providers to act in a more or less 
responsive manner with respect to the communities they 
serve. Incentives here can be understood in terms of the 
costs for the service provider associated with unsatisfac-
tory performance and normally refer to formal disciplinary 
action, but can also entail rewards for good performance 
(both usually involve remuneration or career opportunities).
Answerability is defined by UNDP (2010) as the obligation 
to provide an account and the right to get a response. In 
this discussion, answerability can be understood as voice 
triggering a response from the service provider or pertinent 
authority. It is essential in the sense that it is one of the 
concrete manifestations of the notion that accountability is 
a two-way process, directly engaging citizens and service 
providers. As a concrete example of the interconnection 
of the concepts here discussed, answerability is strongly 
contingent on enforceability, but it also involves a feedback 
process through which the citizens can be informed of the 
use made of the information they have provided; namely to 
whom it has been relayed and what actions are being tak-
en to address the issues uncovered by the social account-
ability exercise.
The theory of change underlying this analytical framework 
departs from the observation, confirmed across many con-
texts, that lack of awareness and knowledge about rights and 
entitlements provides a fertile ground for corrupt practices to 
take hold. For this reason social accountability begins with 
education and awareness raising. This, in the first instance, 
provides citizens with the tools to correctly identify and as-
sess corrupt practices when they are confronted with them 
as they seek to access public services. Very importantly, the 
capacity building also instructs citizens on the formal routes 
of action that they have available to denounce and contest 
corrupt actions. Secondly, the social accountability tool per 
se (be it citizen monitoring, community score cards or other 
modalities) provides a concrete mechanism through which 
citizens may direct their actions in order to join together 
individual experiences and complaints and translate them 
into actionable outputs. This is the point where voice is gen-
erated. Third, voice needs to be communicated to decision 
makers in such a manner that demands a response. Civil 
society organizations often play a critical role in this regard 
because they can enable a constructive engagement with 
public sector officials. When citizens learn that their actions 
have elicited a response, this provides evidence that their 
opinions count and that they are actually capable of exer-
cising their rights in a proactive manner. 
This is the necessary chain of causal actions that can enable 
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the transition from client to citizen, which is needed to over-
come the clout of impunity that allows corruption to take 
hold. The first set of indicators that are compiled in the as-
sessment is, thus, geared to determine whether all the ba-
sic elements to ensure the complete social accountability 
cycle have been taken into account in the project design. 
In the end, a successful social accountability intervention 
should enable the construction of an interface through which 
citizens, local service providers and authorities can devel-
op interactions conducive to improved service provision. 
Besides the need for establishing institutional means and 
mechanisms for information aggregation and transmission, 
such an outcome is contingent upon developing positive syn-
ergies between empowered citizens and responsive service 
providers. We believe that there is no one single route to 
citizen empowerment or to evoke responsiveness of public 
officials. The development (or lack thereof) of these attri-
butes is highly dependent on contextual challenges and 
opportunities. In the next section we present a model that 
outlines such contextual elements.
14
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The social accountability approach aims to be an enabling 
factor for developing constructive and sustainable links be-
tween empowered citizens and responsive public officials. 
Often, however, the reality on the ground is quite different, 
involving entrenched social inequalities, power struggles 
and mistrust among key stakeholders. Social accountability 
approaches will have very little chance of success when, for 
example, citizens are disenfranchised, are sceptical about 
the possibility of bringing about change and prefer to with-
draw from the public sphere as much as possible out of mis-
trust of government and state officials. The same goes for 
cases in which service providers and government officials 
lack incentives to care about citizens’ satisfaction, where 
accountability relationships point towards higher levels in 
the bureaucracy or government, and where impunity is the 
norm. The challenge is, therefore, to develop informed and 
3. A model for contextualiza-
tion
suitable interventions that can correctly assess the initial 
conditions prevailing on both the demand and supply sides 
and, on the basis of these realistic inputs, develop the build-
ing blocks to advance in the desired direction. 
For these reasons, in this assessment we have developed 
indicators for elements that need be taken into account in 
order to enable positive change in a manner that is consis-
tent, not with an ideal outcome, but rather with the actual 
conditions prevailing in each case. We adhere to the spirit 
of “working with the grain,” which emphasizes developing 
forms of governance that build on the actual practices and 
social norms that people targeted by the intervention al-
ready share (D. Booth and Crook 2011; David Booth 2011). 
Therefore, our model is aimed to support the effective con-
textualization of social accountability initiatives by providing 
Figure 3.1: Determinants of citizens - service providers relationship
So
ci
al
 C
ap
ita
l Incentives 
Citizens 
Service 
providers 
Cooperative/ 
Disrupted  
Formal strategies for problem resolution:  
•  Social accountability mechanism 
•  Other formal complaints mechanisms 
Informal strategies for problem resolution:  
•  Pay bribe 
•  Seek influential contacts 
•  Persistence 
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information on the basis of which implementers can take 
informed decisions for program design as well as track 
progress and impact. 
The analytical complement to the formal framework pre-
sented in the previous section is a model for contextualizing 
social accountability initiatives, which has the citizen-service 
provider relationship at its core. This model is depicted in 
Figure 3.1.
In this model, the quality of the relationship between cit-
izens and service providers is shaped, at the micro level, 
by the attitudes with which individuals of these two groups 
interact with each other. At a macro level, the way in which 
communities and providers of public services relate to each 
other is linked to the collective action capabilities of the 
community and the incentives facing service providers. The 
interaction between these contextual attributes at the two 
levels provides the background that shapes the strategies 
that citizens resort to when they face problems accessing 
basic services, for instance when they are faced with cor-
ruption at the point of service. 
The social accountability mechanism provides an entry point 
for catalyzing change because, if properly designed, it can 
positively influence citizen motivations through capacity 
building and rights awareness, will link up citizen inputs to 
providers’ incentives, and enable an institutionalized mecha-
nism of problem resolution which can enable iterative cycles 
of interaction and collaborative conflict resolution between 
citizens and public officials.
In order to collect the relevant information associated to 
this model we have developed indicators along the lines of 
the following categories:
• Prevailing attitudes of citizens and service providers 
toward each other
• Contextual determinants of citizens’ attitudes
• Contextual determinants of service providers’ incentives
• Strategies employed by citizens to obtain public services
We explain each of these categories in detail next.
3.1 Prevailing attitudes of  
citizens and service providers  
toward each other
Indicators of the attitudes of citizens/ users and service 
providers supply important information to develop a base-
line to the assessment and to monitor progress at a later 
stage. These attitudes are likely to be shaped by a constel-
lation of factors, including history, regime type, previous 
experiences in the citizen-provider interaction, entrenched 
power asymmetries, and scarcity of resources. While it goes 
beyond the scope of the assessment to establish which of 
these potential elements are more relevant for each context, 
the observed outcomes (expressed in the manner in which 
actual interactions take place) are of central importance to 
the assessment of social accountability initiatives.
For the purposes of the assessment we operationalize two 
sets of attitudes for each group, one associated with empow-
ered citizens and responsive service providers (cooperative), 
and the other one associated with disenfranchised citizens 
and unresponsive service providers (disrupted).3 Tables 1. 
and 2. illustrate these concepts.
Through application of the survey, two sets of indicators are 
generated, which reflect the extent to which citizens’ and 
service providers’ attitudes approximate the cooperative or 
the disrupted models. 
3 These categories are by no means intended to be comprehensive or 
conclusive of the range of attitudes with which citizens and services 
providers may approach each other. Rather, they represent “ideal types” 
which are useful to develop measurements for the assessment and are 
indicative of the overall manner in which public services are delivered in 
a certain context and in this respect can be an instrument to track im-
pact and progress of the social accountability initiative.
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Table 1: Dichotomous model of citizens’ attitudes towards providers of essential public services
Cooperative Disrupted
Empowerment I enjoy inalienable rights and entitlements 
and if needed I will take action to make 
them effective
Vulnerability I must gain the good will of service pro-
viders and public officials to receive 
benefits and services
Trust I can count on the actions of state officials 
and institutions to realize my entitlements
Mistrust I don’t trust that public officials will 
abide by their mandate and act towards 
realizing my entitlements
Motivation I can exercise my agency and citizens act-
ing together can bring state officials to ac-
count
Apathy No matter what I do the prevailing prob-
lems I encounter dealing with the public 
sector cannot be overcome
Table 2: Dichotomous model of service providers’ attitudes towards citizens
Cooperative Disrupted
Accountability Service delivery is permeated by an aware-
ness of mandate vis-à-vis citizens, rein-
forced by the knowledge that failure to per-
form entails sanctions
Impunity Lack of disposition to uphold citizens’ 
entitlements reinforced by the certain-
ty that no punishment will come from 
misconduct.
Embedded-
ness
Sense of being part of the communities ser-
vice providers tend to, better understanding 
of their needs and concerns.
Detachment Sense of distance in relation to cit-
izens/service users, “us and them” 
perspective which may or may not be 
fueled by socioeconomic, ethnic, reli-
gious or other kind of social cleavage. 
Responsive The actions of service providers take into 
account and respond to citizens’ expressed 
needs.
Conflictive Confrontational disposition vis-à-vis 
citizens/users (arrogance, rudeness, 
abuse of power).
17
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3.2 Contextual determinants of 
citizens’ attitudes
The starting point to assess the determinants of citizens’ 
attitudes is the degree to which a developed civil society 
exists and how this interacts with social norms and values 
to define the collective action capabilities of the commu-
nity in question.
The assessment probes the importance attached by com-
munity members to a series of social values, which indicate 
whether the predominant patterns of social interaction may 
be characterised as individualistic or communitarian. This 
dimension sheds light into the importance attached to so-
cial networks and collective resources for the exercise of 
individual agency. In other words, this element points to the 
social appropriateness of engaging in collective or individual 
problem solving behaviours.
Furthermore, the research inquires about citizen partici-
pation in voluntary associations. The assumption, which 
is extensively backed by the literature, is that citizens in 
a strong civil society are empowered, are able to engage 
in collective action independent of the state and can take 
action to effectively demand accountability from the state 
(Foley and Edwards 1996; Robert D Putnam, Leonardi, and 
Nanetti 1993; Fukuyama 2001; Ostrander 2013; Fox 1996). 
The underlying rationale is that the existence of a multi-
plicity of autonomous associations through which citizens 
participate and interact enables the development of social 
capital, which is here understood as “features of social or-
ganization such as networks, norms and trust, that facilitate 
coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Robert 
D. Putnam 1995). 
The key words here are trust, cooperation and coordination 
since social capital enables citizens to engage in effective 
collective action, to articulate demands vis-à-vis the state 
and to provide checks against the abuse of public power 
(Fukuyama 2001; Hadenius and Uggla 1996; Robert D. 
Putnam 1993).4 Thus, because these notions are in this 
manner expected to correlate with institutional trust, the 
methodology also inquires into the degree to which citizens 
trust both state and non-state institutions.
For the purposes of our assessment we are interested in 
obtaining insights about some of the dimensions associat-
ed with the concept of social capital because they closely 
correlate with the objectives of participatory initiatives in 
terms of supporting the empowerment of citizens and es-
tablishing mechanisms of collective action through which 
civil society can better engage with the providers of public 
services. Therefore, the assessment seeks to compile in-
formation about instances where positive public/private 
interactions (including lines of communication and actual 
coordination efforts) may already be occurring because, 
ultimately, successful and effective social accountability 
initiatives can be expected to facilitate coproduction of 
public services.5 Adding this latter dimension to the analysis 
contributes to providing a wider picture to enable decision 
makers to think creatively about ways in which social ac-
countability initiatives may be linked to pre-existing organi-
zations or networks, thus maximizing impact and exploiting 
latent synergies.
Thus, the research toolkit generates information pertaining 
to the following categories:
• Level of trust towards a broad range of state and non-
state institutions
• Participation in voluntary associations (presence of hor-
izontal networks)
4 While different hypotheses have been proposed to answer the question 
of how social capital is actually created, it goes beyond the scope of 
this project to assess the relative merits of each.
5 Coproduction refers to situations where public agents and citizens, by 
providing different kinds of inputs, can produce more efficiently by com-
bining their efforts as compared to either producing everything publicly 
or everything privately (Evans et al. 1996, 1123, Ostrom 1996, 1073). 
Coproduction defines a democratic type of engagement across the pub-
lic/private divide because it necessarily requires a minimum of trust and 
cooperative disposition between local public officers and the popula-
tions they serve.
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Resource constraints are often associated to corruption 
risks to the extent that low salaries, difficult workplace con-
ditions and unfulfilled expectations affect the disposition of 
public officials toward the manner in which they perform 
their duties. But at a more practical level, resources con-
straints matter for the assessment because corruption can 
also work as a mechanism for resource allocation where 
demand exceeds supply.  
Taking a rational choice perspective, opportunities are here 
operationalized as the financial and career advancement in-
centives facing service providers. Hence, we assume that 
service providers will likely be accountable to those who 
have decision-making power over their status, career path 
or wealth. Therefore, to assess the elements that make a 
difference in making public service providers accountable 
we need to know whether financial incentives and career 
promotion opportunities for service providers are in any 
way linked to performance. Also incorporated into the as-
sessment is information on whether local officials are dem-
ocratically elected.
Finally, we take into account the presence of legal and nor-
mative constraints. The former are operationalized as the 
presence of formal sanctions for engaging in corrupt activ-
ities, and whether those sanctions are effectively applied. 
Normative constraints refer to the social and reputational 
costs associated with corrupt behaviours, and are expected 
to be closely linked to the social norms prevailing in each 
particular context as well as to the nature of the relationship 
between the public officials and the communities they serve. 
Accordingly, the toolkit generates information on the fol-
lowing elements:
• Are financial incentives for service providers in any way 
linked to performance?
• Are career promotion incentives for service providers in 
any way linked to performance?
• Are local government officials elected democratically?
• Are performance-monitoring mechanisms in place and 
regularly applied?
• Communitarian or individualistic patterns for problem 
solving 
• Importance of a variety of social norms such as reciproc-
ity, gift giving, solidarity, respect for elders
• Identified instances of collaborative practices cutting 
across the public-private divide
These indicators are relevant because they point to intan-
gible resources, which are conducive to collective action. 
Shared social norms, the patterns and intensity of social 
interactions, availability of social networks and trust in insti-
tutions matter for the development of social accountability 
strategies as they are attributes that shape the expectations 
of individuals on the likely outcomes from participating in 
anti-corruption activities. Furthermore, associated to the 
concept of coproduction, these indicators also capture 
the existence (or non-existence) of communication and 
collaboration mechanisms between civil society and the 
state. Taken together, this set of indicators contributes to 
provide a wider picture of the social context in order to en-
able practitioners to think creatively about ways in which 
social accountability initiatives may be linked to pre-exist-
ing organizations or networks, thus maximizing impact and 
exploiting latent synergies.
3.3 Incentives for public service 
workers/providers
In order to assess the determinants of service providers’ 
attitudes we compile information about the incentives given 
by the regulatory framework under which they operate as 
well as the informal rules and understandings they share with 
those around them. Accordingly, we incorporate the formu-
lation that control of corruption is a function of availability 
of resources and opportunities and the presence of legal 
and/or normative constraints (Mungiu-Pippidi 2014). The 
goal is to uncover the elements affecting the motivations for 
the public service workers to perform adequately, but also 
to figure out to which constituency they are accountable.
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• Are there sanctions associated with inappropriate be-
haviours and are they enforced?
• Are there any reputational costs to service providers in 
the community for engaging in corrupt practices?
These indicators provide valuable information to support 
the design of effective social accountability initiatives to the 
extent that experience has shown that generating voice in 
itself is not enough to advance in building direct account-
ability links in public services unless a connection between 
citizen’s satisfaction and service providers’ incentives can 
be established. Therefore, understanding the elements driv-
ing corrupt behaviours on the side of public sector workers 
is important in order to determine who are the responsible 
decision makers to whom citizen participation may be most 
fruitfully linked and what may be the most important topics 
in need to be addressed in order to shift their incentives 
towards greater responsiveness. 
3.4 Strategies employed by citi-
zens to obtain public services. 
Citizens’ and public service providers’ attitudes as well as 
the wider context involving strength of community networks 
and provider incentives are important factors for our assess-
ment of social accountability. They shape expectations and 
define the resources that citizens have available to them 
when confronting problems with public service provision. 
Based on past experiences individuals form their ideas about 
the kind of treatment they can expect when seeking public 
services. The wider context, to the extent that social cap-
ital is prevalent (or not), may provide (or not) possibilities 
where citizens can exercise agency and even engage in 
collective action to demand an effective realization of their 
entitlements.  
Therefore, in each context citizens will have unique incen-
tives, motivations and resources to choose among different 
strategies to deal with problems in accessing public ser-
vices. The strategies may be formal, involving established 
institutional mechanisms of feedback and complaints man-
agement, but they may also be informal involving irregular 
(and often illegal) actions such as giving bribes and looking 
for informal sources of influence or pressure to obtain the 
required service. Our aim is to understand how expecta-
tions and community resources shape citizens’ preferred 
strategies, and whether these are formal or informal. The 
assumption is that an understanding of why citizens choose 
an informal mechanism of problem resolution over a formal 
one is critical to develop alternatives (in the form of the social 
accountability mechanism) that are feasible and adequate 
for the social context. 
In this assessment we incorporate citizens’ perceptions 
of the relative effectiveness of both formal and informal 
strategies of problem resolution within their communities. 
As part of the baseline data collected, this information is 
relevant to assess the impact of social accountability ini-
tiatives since, in a successful scenario, informal strategies 
would give way to formal ones, including use of the social 
accountability mechanism. 
Also, part of the inquiry is aimed at understanding who are 
the actors within the community to which citizens most often 
resort to in order to seek solutions to problems accessing 
public services.
The indicators in this group include:
• Availability of channels to place complaints
• Ability to obtain services without recourse to informal 
means
• Preferred problem resolution technique:
• Informal: 
• Ask for intervention of a friend 
• Ask for intervention of a relative 
• Ask for intervention of an important person 
• Pay a bribe 
• Give a gift 
• Persistence 
• Avoid dealing with that institution
20
Communities against corruption: Assessment framework and methodological toolkit
B A S E L I N S T I T U T E O N G O V E R N A N C E
Working paper series No. 18
 
• Formal: 
• Use of formal complaint mechanisms of that 
institution 
• Denounce to anticorruption agency 
• Denounce with local government representa-
tives 
• Use of the social accountability mechanism
• Perceptions of prevalence of corruption in the 
community
A better understanding of why citizens may opt for infor-
mal mechanisms of problem resolution over formal ones 
is critical to develop alternatives, in the form of the social 
accountability mechanisms, that are feasible and adequate 
to the context. Furthermore, as part of the baseline data 
collected, this information is relevant to assess the impact 
of social accountability initiatives: In a successful scenario, 
informal strategies would give way to formal ones, including 
use of the social accountability mechanism.
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4. Serbia
Corruption in the Serbian health sector is a well-recognized 
problem, not least because of the particularly deleterious 
effects it has upon individual and social welfare. It manifests 
itself mostly in the form of informal payments to obtain or to 
expedite treatment and in the diversion of patients to doc-
tors’ private practice. Because the nature of these corrupt 
transactions makes monitoring extremely difficult (since they 
happen during the interaction between patient and medical 
staff), the direct engagement of precisely those individuals 
who experience and suffer the impact of corruption holds 
great promise. However, the Serbian case also provides an 
example of significantly adverse initial conditions for exer-
cising social accountability. For this reason, and as the next 
sections will illustrate, it becomes especially critical to take 
into account the challenges presented by the social context 
and to work with them in order to develop the most suitable 
intervention to maximise citizen uptake. 
4.1 Social accountability project 
description
The project “Zero Tolerance for Corruption in the Health 
Sector in Serbia” (ZTCHSS) involves the introduction of cit-
izens’ charters as a means to improve the ability of users 
to detect and defend themselves against corrupt practices 
in the health sector. Citizens’ charters are documents that 
inform citizens about: a) the service entitlements they have 
as users of a public service, b) the standards they can expect 
for a service (time frame and quality), c) remedies available 
for non-adherence to standards and d) the procedures, costs 
and charges of a service (World Bank 2014).
In the case of the ZTCHSS project, citizens’ charters are 
designed and developed for selected service areas across 
a series of key processes, such as admissions, urgent sur-
gery, elective surgery and specialist examination, which have 
been identified as being especially vulnerable to corruption. 
The citizens’ charters provide a reporting mechanism, 
namely an SMS service, through which patients may report 
irregularities. The SMS service is managed by a CSO, which 
relays the information to the appropriate authorities, in this 
case the advisor of patients’ rights6.  
4.2 Context assessment
4.2.1 Prevailing attitudes among users and health 
service providers
In Belgrade, feelings of impotence and vulnerability pervaded 
the accounts of users as they described their interactions 
with providers of health services. A majority of respondents 
reported feeling powerless to do anything to protect them-
selves and their relatives from corrupt actions; feelings of 
anger, disappointment, apathy, impotence and vulnerabili-
ty pervaded the accounts of users as they described their 
interactions with providers of health services. Figure 4.1. 
reports the results of the survey when respondents were 
asked whether they are able to obtain services based solely 
on their own means. As is clear from the graphic, generally 
speaking a majority of respondents are not able to straight-
forwardly obtain access to a broad range of services. This 
suggests a broader context in which transactions across 
both public and non-state institutions are dominated by 
particularistic criteria of resource allocation.
In particular, regarding access to health services, focus 
group discussions (FGDs) and interviews revealed a com-
mon appraisal that when a medical practitioner engages 
in inadequate behaviour there is very little patients can do 
about it. The common perception is that medical staff are 
protected and, therefore, untouchable. Furthermore, ac-
counts were given which depict an imbalanced relationship 
between medical staff and patients, with an “us and them” 
mindset prevailing among the former and where the latter 
are looked down upon. 
6 The advisor of patients’ rights is a successor of the previous protector of 
patients’ rights, which was a figure created in 2005 with the mandate of 
dealing with patients’ complaints, acting as a mediator between patients 
and healthcare professionals, and providing legal advice to patients in 
relation to all non-medical problems encountered when seeking health 
services.
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Another problematic dimension that, for several reasons, 
generates friction in the interactions between medical staff 
and patients is the lack of information on the part of pa-
tients. According to a protector of patients’ rights, a recur-
ring problem is that patients do not receive adequate in-
formation during their treatment. According to this source, 
medical practitioners often do not take the time to explain 
treatment and procedures to patients, which makes them 
confused and scared during the whole period of treatment. 
Whether deliberate or by omission, keeping patients unin-
formed reinforces the power asymmetries existing between 
these two groups. A medical practitioner also commented 
that the lack of information on the side of patients creates 
tensions because patients have unrealistic expectations of 
what they are entitled to.
In sum, the research revealed the prevalence of feelings of 
vulnerability, mistrust and apathy on the part of patients and 
a sense of impunity, detachment and conflict pervading pro-
viders’ behaviours suggesting that a disrupted relationship 
prevails among users and medical staff. Thus, a significant 
challenge to developing effective social accountability in 
the Serbian health sector is that, on the one hand, medical 
staff tend to not view patients as bearers of rights and en-
titlements and, on the other hand, patients feel disempow-
ered and vulnerable.
4.2.2 Contextual determinants of citizens’ attitudes
In terms of the broader social context and the potential 
resources it offers for collective action, the research in 
Belgrade revealed very low levels of trust across state and 
Figure 4.1: Ability to obtain service on your own
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Trust in Institutions 
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non-state institutions alike, a preference for individual prob-
lem solving strategies and very low participation in volun-
tary associations. 
Figure 4.2. illustrates that trust levels towards a broad range 
of institutions are low across the board. Interestingly, even 
though health care providers were ranked highest among 
respondents, only 30% declared having high trust in them.
Furthermore, the research revealed that lack of trust is not 
only related to institutions but also prevails among individ-
uals to the extent that research participants characterised 
themselves and the people around them as lacking a sense of 
community. During FGDs, participants expressed disagree-
ment on what makes them members of a community, and 
even about the notion of what belonging to a community 
means. According to FGD participants, in their daily life ex-
periences community is barely existent and its presence is 
not really felt in the city. Rather, research participants ex-
pressed an individualistic preference to manage problems 
and, in general, shared the perception that Belgrade citi-
zens depend primarily on themselves, whereas community 
has a secondary role in solving their problems. In fact the 
majority of survey respondents believed it is the individual 
who can do most for oneself.
Consistent with the previous finding, other indicators re-
vealed a weak civil society. For instance, a large segment 
of the citizens who participated in the survey (38%) reported 
not to participate in any kind of organization. While some 
Figure 4.2: Trust in institutions
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evidence was brought forward on some local grassroots 
movements built and driven by narrow, pragmatic inter-
ests (environmental issues for example), these participato-
ry experiments most of the time proved to be short lived. 
Participation also appears to vary among different demo-
graphics, for example Roma people tend to stay away from 
social gatherings. 
Overall, available evidence suggests that civil society re-
mains underdeveloped in the Serbian context. Active CSOs 
face the challenge of mobilizing a population that appears 
to be both apathetic and sceptical of the prospects of at-
taining positive changes through collective action. Serbian 
CSOs typically face very limited participation as indicated 
by a study showing that 92% of Serbian CSOs have less than 
20 active members (Civic Initiatives 2011). 
In the study in Belgrade, no evidence was found of mech-
anisms of public-private collaboration that could fall under 
the scope of coproduction. Rather, several stakeholders 
reported a situation of lack of responsiveness on the part 
of government authorities to the problems articulated by 
CSOs. An associated problem is the lack of established in-
stitutional mechanisms for CSOs to interact with the state.
Thus, in sum, the research suggests that the broader social 
context in Belgrade does not provide significant collective 
action opportunities to the extent that there is widespread 
lack of trust, an individualistic inclination to problem solving 
and very low participation in voluntary associations.
4.2.3 Service providers’ incentives
A critical problem health practitioners identified during in-
terviews as determinant in impeding adequate provision of 
services is a significant resource scarcity. This situation, it 
was stressed, generates excess demand and compromis-
es the overall health system’s performance. In terms of re-
muneration, the current formal mechanisms in the Serbian 
health sector provide for rigid pay criteria, with no room 
for productivity bonuses and very little in the way of incen-
tivizing staff. Rather, medical staff salaries are determined 
through centralized budgeting, which is based on previous 
budget allocations and not in any way linked to performance.
Evidence obtained through the FGDs and interviews suggests 
that corruption is often used in Belgrade health facilities as 
a mechanism to overcome the constraints imposed by re-
source scarcity and rigid remuneration schemes to the ex-
tent that the ability to bribe and to use influences become 
the criteria for resource allocation when medical supplies, 
medicines or even health personnel’s time are scarce. Sim-
ilarly, accepting informal payments or diverting patients to 
private practice are means to obtain extra income. 
Another element facilitating widespread corrupt practices 
in the health sector is the absence of adequate monitoring 
and enforcement mechanisms. Significantly, the protected 
nature of employment in the Serbian public sector, which 
makes dismissing staff extremely difficult, is one factor 
that promotes impunity. Also mentioned as reinforcing the 
perception of low costs to corrupt actions are networks of 
mutual protection among medical staff and informal mech-
anisms of promotion and career advancement based on 
partisan identities. 
Thus, in sum, resource scarcity, rigid pay criteria, informal 
mechanisms of career advancement and weak legal and 
normative constraints combine to shape a breeding ground 
on which corrupt practices can easily thrive.
4.2.4 Strategies to obtain public services
Overall, the research findings reveal that citizens are mostly 
unaware of the available mechanisms to process complaints 
in the health sector. As an example of this, 67% of survey 
respondents answered negatively when asked if they feel 
they have the means to express dissatisfaction when the 
treatment received by their service provider is not appro-
priate. However, even in cases where there is awareness 
of established complaints and problem resolution mecha-
nisms, the prevailing opinion was that people do not use 
them because they are not trusted to be effective. Lack of 
trust in formal mechanisms, in turn, reinforces a generalized 
preference to resort to informal means in order to obtain 
adequate health services.
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As Figure 4.3. shows asking for intervention of an import-
ant person or a friend was perceived as the most effective 
strategy to obtain services among survey respondents. 
Additionally, a generally agreed view among research par-
ticipants was that gift-giving is a widespread and enrooted 
practice. Tellingly, FGD participants even believed that gift 
giving is positively evaluated within the community because 
it is understood as a rational behaviour. Furthermore, some 
individuals even expressed the view that gift giving is a nec-
essary social skill.
4.3 Project overview: Strengths, 
challenges and suggestions
The context assessment suggests that the project ZTCHSS 
is well-suited to address identified needs in several respects. 
First, the research signalled a lack of adequate information 
among citizens as one of the factors that increases their like-
lihood of becoming victims of corrupt acts. In that regard the 
Citizens’ Charters have the potential to be an effective tool 
to disseminate information about rights and entitlements in 
an easy to grasp and actionable format right at the point of 
service delivery. Furthermore, disseminating concrete and 
specific information about what constitutes a corrupt act 
while receiving health services is especially important in a 
context such as the Serbian, where gift giving is considered 
to be an important part of the culture. 
The use of an SMS reporting mechanism is also adequate to 
the social background. As the research revealed, people are 
more inclined to seek individualistic mechanisms to resolve 
their problems. Therefore, in the context of Belgrade, this 
kind of tool for inviting social accountability participation is 
better-suited than others, such as community score cards 
or community monitoring, which require a deliberate col-
lective effort on the part of citizens. Furthermore, ease of 
use and privacy gives this formal mechanism to denounce 
corruption an advantage over other existing ones.
That being said, and given the evidence obtained through the 
assessment, it is apparent that one of the biggest challenges 
Str tegi s f r problem solving 
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1. Ask for intervention from a friend 
2. Ask for intervention from a relative 
3. Ask for intervention from an important person 
4. Pay a fee 
5. Give a small gift 
6. Denounce the disservice to the competent authorities 
7. Try several times until he/she gets a good result 
8. Avoid in general dealing with that institution 
Figure 4.3: Strategies for problem solving
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facing any type of social accountability initiative in Serbia 
today is the widespread lack of trust among citizens towards 
most institutions in the public sector and, generally speak-
ing, about the ability of citizen action to induce meaningful 
change. Trust building is likely to be a long-term process. 
For this reason, it was recommended to explicitly incorpo-
rate a feedback component to the SMS mechanism, through 
which citizens may be kept informed of the manner in which 
responsible authorities plan to proceed with the informa-
tion generated. 
Finally, a highly problematic area for the effectiveness of 
social accountability initiatives in the Serbian health sector 
is the difficulty to enforce sanctions for wrongdoing vis-à-vis 
the medical staff. In the current situation, not only is there 
no link between performance and salaries or career promo-
tion, but the acknowledged importance of partisanship and 
political rivalries in health institutions work to perpetuate 
collusive behaviour and assure impunity. Indeed, enforce-
ability tends to be the most difficult component to incorpo-
rate into social accountability programmes because it often 
requires reforms to the legal and regulatory frameworks 
governing the terms of employment of civil servants. In the 
Serbian case, it is clear that this is a politically sensitive 
area, which underscores the limits of social accountability 
approaches, the importance of political will, and the need 
to adopt a holistic perspective to successfully develop con-
trol-of-corruption strategies. 
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5. Philippines
The Philippines is a pertinent case study for a comparative 
assessment of social accountability initiatives because its 
sheer geography (thousands of islands, the largest of which 
have vast expanses of jungles and mountains that separate 
large populations) has necessitated some form of decentral-
ized or at least de-concentrated governance for centuries 
(Azfar and Gurgur 2008). Furthermore, according to some 
authors, much of the corruption in the Philippines appears 
to happen at the local level with around 49% of corruption 
cases open in 2000 involving municipal mayors (Batalla 
2000). Local Government Units (LGUs) have authority to 
create their own revenue sources and are responsible for 
the delivery of essential public services. Under these con-
ditions, social accountability initiatives in the Philippines 
have a significant potential to achieve positive governance 
and development outcomes.
5.1 Social accountability project 
description
Project “Bayaniham Undertaking Living in a Healthy and Or-
ganized Neighborhood” or BULHON sa Panguma (BULHON) 
is a joint government-citizen intiative to monitor agricultural 
services, particularly the distribution of rice subsidies and 
production programs. The project has been designed by 
Government Watch (G-Watch) and implemented in the mu-
nicipality of San Miguel in Bohol island. It targets the Rice 
Production Program, which is one of the basic services of-
fered by the San Miguel Municipal Agriculture Office (MAO). 
The primary goal of BULHON is to ensure that the right 
type, quality and quantity of rice production programs and 
related services are provided to beneficiaries following es-
tablished standard processes that ensure effective and effi-
cient service delivery (G-Watch Program 2012, 5). The main 
mechanism to attain that goal is performance monitoring 
that involves joint citizen-LGU participation. It comprises 
direct observation of how the LGU rice subsidy program is 
implemented and the assessment is recorded systematically 
through the use of a monitoring tool. Findings are analysed 
and discussed in the context of a core group composed of 
LGU officials and citizens.
5.2 Context assessment
5.2.1 Prevailing attitudes among users and LGU offi-
cials
In San Miguel, the overarching feeling was that the mayor 
and local government officials are accessible and respon-
sive. Furthermore, citizen monitors participating in FGDs 
reported that as a result of being involved in the initiative 
they had developed closer ties to the LGU. 
Perhaps the only caveat in this regard, as expressed by 
FGD participants, was that although community members 
can obtain services from the LGU, ease of access is greatly 
facilitated through membership in one of the community’s 
Farmers’ Associations (FAs). Interviews with leaders of FAs 
and LGU officials subsequently confirmed that, because of 
logistical and scheduling constraints given by the time con-
suming nature of agricultural activities, unorganized farmers 
are harder to reach and it is with regards to this that, out of 
practical motives, dialogue with FAs and their members is 
facilitated. LGU officials also explained that, being aware of 
this situation, they strive to capture the feedback and con-
cerns of unorganized farmers through their participation in 
other venues, such as the community (barangay) assembly.
Notwithstanding the case of unorganized farmers, the re-
search findings showed that the majority of residents in San 
Miguel feel that they can access public services based solely 
on their own means, as illustrated in Figure 5.1.
The research also suggested that the LGU has a proactive 
stance in reaching out to citizens in order to obtain their 
inputs and that citizens’ views are normally taken into ac-
count for decision making. The general perception among 
research participants was that LGU officials are responsive 
to their constituents and embrace a cooperative disposition 
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towards them for example by means of SMS communica-
tion and regular house visits to address citizens’ problems 
and concerns. 
In sum, the research revealed a cooperative relationship 
prevailing among the communities of San Miguel, Bohol and 
LGU officials, which already represents a positive founda-
tion upon which to develop social accountability initiatives.
5.2.2 Contextual determinants of citizens’ attitudes
Responses to the survey revealed high levels of trust in public 
institutions, especially the LGU and those institutions pro-
viding essential services such as health and education (See 
Figure 5.2). The research further revealed that this high level 
of institutional trust is embedded in a social context charac-
terized by a strong communitarian orientation permeating 
social interactions, as well as a high level of participation 
in a multitude of community-based voluntary associations. 
Communitarian attitudes are strong among inhabitants of 
San Miguel, where the community assembly is widely indi-
cated as the concrete manifestation of the more abstract 
concept of community. According to FGD participants, a 
citizen belongs to the community when he or she is invited 
or allowed to actively participate in community events such 
as the assemblies, which are the main venue where people 
come together to articulate and discuss their concerns. 
Participation in the assemblies was reported to be high 
(around 80% according to the estimation of an LGU official). 
Besides attending community assemblies, citizens in San 
Miguel also actively participate in a variety of other vol-
untary associations. 86% of survey respondents declared 
that they participate in at least one type of organization 
of which farmers’ associations were the most cited (30%), 
followed by women’s organizations (16%) and faith based 
associations (14%). 
These findings suggest that the communities of San Miguel 
are characterized by a multiplicity of horizontal networks 
connecting citizens to each other and where participation is 
significant. As the literature suggests, this is connected with 
high levels of social capital and institutional trust, which in 
turn provide a fertile ground upon which to build collective 
action initiatives. 
Figure 5.1: Ability to obtain service on your own
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In fact, in San Miguel, multiple examples of communica-
tion mechanisms linking citizens and LGU can be identified 
as well as instances where coordination and cooperative 
actions cross the public-private divide. The LGU actively 
reaches out to the communities through multiple channels. 
For instance, a comprehensive effort takes place once a 
year when the LGU organizes a Municipal Government 
Information and Action Caravan to actively seek out the 
problems, complaints and concerns of the people across 
the 18 barangays that make up the municipality. On a more 
frequent basis, LGU members attend community assem-
blies, as well as CSO and FA meetings. Agricultural tech-
nologists are normally invited to attend FA meetings and 
relay the pertinent information directly back to the MAO. 
Also, LGU projects or events are often announced after 
Sunday mass, which provides a good vehicle to communi-
cate with citizens, as most of the residents of San Miguel 
are regular churchgoers.
5.2.3 Service providers’ incentives
A first consideration that underpins the incentives on the 
part of the LGU is that the mayor of the locality is an elect-
ed public official, which is a key element establishing a 
direct accountability line between LGU and citizens. It is 
also meaningful given that important positions within the 
LGU, such as the MAO, are appointed directly by the mayor.
Secondly, the LGU in San Miguel has established and in-
stitutionalized mechanisms to enable communication and 
consultation to take place with the communities. For in-
stance, People’s Organizations and Farmer Associations 
regularly participate in LGU consultations, the Municipal 
Agriculture-Fishery Council is open to public consultations 
on a regular basis, and the mayor and other LGU officials 
regularly attend community assemblies. Such close links are 
important to note because they play a role to significantly 
reduce the opportunity space for arbitrary and/or corrupt 
actions on the part of local government officials.
Further affecting the incentives of LGU officials is their 
embeddedness in the communities. Following Peter Evans 
(Evans 1996) embeddedness refers to situations in which 
the boundaries between public and private are somewhat 
blurred and there is a deep involvement on the part of public 
officials in the lives of the communities they serve. The fact 
that LGU officials sometimes make house visits to address 
Figure 5.2: Trust in institutions
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the concerns of community members or that the mayor and 
other LGU officers have made their mobile phone numbers 
public and communicate by SMS with community members 
are examples of this blurred public/private divide. 
Thus, the incentives underpinning the motivations of LGU 
officials are linked to a basic principle of democratic ac-
countability, which promotes government responsiveness. 
This is further reinforced by established communication and 
consultation mechanisms linking communities and LGU, and 
by the close relationship of public officials with the com-
munities. The latter elements support transparency in the 
conduct of government and furthermore, tight community 
links can be expected to generate significant normative 
constraints to the actions of LGU officials.
5.2.4 Strategies to obtain public services
Overall, research findings suggest that community mem-
bers in San Miguel believe they have access to complaints 
mechanisms to denounce inadequate public services. When 
asked whether they have the means to express dissatis-
faction when the treatment received by local government/ 
public service providers is not appropriate, 83% of survey 
respondents agreed that they do. Of those, 75% identified 
the community assembly as the main mechanism through 
which they can express dissatisfaction. 
In terms of preferred problem resolution tactics, the most 
frequently used strategy reported by survey respondents 
(44%) was to ask for the intervention of an important per-
son. Reporting to the competent authorities was chosen 
next by 27% of respondents. Significantly, no respondents 
to the survey chose gift giving as a strategy for problem 
solving (See Figure 5.3.).
However, it is important to take into consideration the par-
ticular context of San Miguel to properly interpret these 
responses. In other settings, seeking the intervention of an 
important person often reflects the existence of personal-
istic networks of privilege, which operate in secrecy and in 
which those with connections obtain access and favours 
at the expense of other, less well-connected citizens. In 
San Miguel, as has been mentioned before, because em-
beddedness of LGU officials in the communities is a factor 
that blurs the line between public and private, this can pave 
the way for informal personalistic contacts to become an 
effective way to obtain solutions to problems. The crucial 
difference here is that these personalistic contacts are not 
exclusive and therefore do not generate socially regressive 
consequences but rather, it can be said, even contribute to 
making public officials more responsive and the provision 
of services more effective. 
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5.3 Project overview: Strengths, 
challenges and suggestions
Overall, the evidence gathered through the research in-
dicates that the BULHON project has been successful in 
reaching its goals of improving the delivery of a key public 
program and increasing transparency and accountability of 
local government through citizen participatory inputs. Be-
cause LGU officials are tightly embedded in the communi-
ty and responsive to the community members’ needs, the 
citizen monitors have been able to work directly with the 
authorities who have the decision making capabilities to 
take immediate actions and respond to problems, meaning 
that enforcement and answerability in the BULHON social 
accountability initiative are de facto integrated into the 
monitoring exercise.
Furthermore, the research revealed that project BULHON 
has empowered participants, since the monitors reported 
beneficial social by-products from the trainings and from 
the monitoring such as gaining recognition and respect in 
the communities, and some of them are now regarded as 
farming experts, from whom other community members 
seek advice.
The research also suggested a positive impact of the BUL-
HON project on local government performance. Some lead-
ers of FAs stated that as a result of the monitoring there has 
been a noticeable improvement in the timeliness and overall 
quality of service delivery. Many stakeholders suggested 
extending the monitoring to other sectors and expanding 
the scope of the trainings and the activities undertaken 
by monitors. The leader of a CSO recommended training 
monitors on farming technologies to make them more ef-
fective in addressing farmers’ concerns given that they are 
already being sought after for advice. This statement is a 
meaningful one, because it identifies and recognizes a way 
in which empowerment of citizen monitors has positive spill 
over effects for the community as a whole. In a context of 
dense social networks, such as San Miguel, it seems that 
the empowerment of individuals works to indirectly empower 
the community as a whole since it contributes a new and 
trusted source of information and expertise that represents, 
in and of itself, a public good. 
Figure 5.3: Strategies for problem solving
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6. Ghana
Corruption in the health sector in Ghana has been report-
ed to have reached extreme levels. According to a World 
Bank report (World Bank 2010) Ghana is the second most 
corrupt country in Africa in terms of managing resources in 
the health sector. Whereas the Ghanaian government has 
implemented significant reforms aimed at improving access 
to primary health care, such as the National Health Insurance 
Scheme (NHIS), concerns persist about lack of transpar-
ency in management and inadequate monitoring of facility 
level performance. This is in spite of the recognized gains 
the country has made in developing democratic institutions 
(Freedom House 2014). Thus, Ghana is a relevant case to 
understand how further progress to deepen democratiza-
tion may prove to be a key factor in tackling corruption in 
the delivery of essential services.
6.1 Social accountability project 
description
The Ghana Integrity Initiative Social Accountability project 
(GII-SA) targets the health sector with a specific focus on 
the administration of funds from the NHIS as well as other 
special interventions aimed at promoting access to quality 
health services for the majority of Ghanaians. The assess-
ment was applied in the following communities in which 
project GII-SA had been piloted: Bisease and Ajumako-Ku-
masi communities in the Ajumako district and Teteman 
community in the Jasikan district.
The social accountability tool that is employed in this project 
Ability to obtain service on your own 
0.00% 
10.00% 
20.00% 
30.00% 
40.00% 
50.00% 
60.00% 
70.00% 
80.00% 
90.00% 
100.00% 
Di
str
ict
 A
ss
em
bly
 
Ru
lin
g p
oli
tic
al 
pa
rty
 
Op
po
sit
ion
 p
ar
tie
s 
Co
m
m
un
ity
 C
hie
fs 
(N
an
a) 
Co
m
m
un
ity
 A
ss
em
bly
 
M
ini
str
y o
f H
ea
lth
 
Tra
dit
ion
al 
He
alt
h A
tte
nd
an
t 
Co
m
m
iss
ion
 o
n 
Hu
m
an
 R
igh
ts 
an
d 
De
pa
rtm
en
t o
f S
oc
ial
 W
elf
ar
e 
Un
ion
s 
Lo
ca
l s
ch
oo
l 
He
alt
h 
ca
re
 p
ro
vid
er
s 
He
alt
h 
Ins
ur
an
ce
 Sc
he
m
e 
Re
lig
iou
s A
ut
ho
rit
ies
 
Po
lic
e 
CS
Os
 
CB
Os
 
Se
lf H
elp
 n
et
wo
rk
s 
Co
ur
ts 
/ J
ud
ge
s 
M
ed
ia 
Int
er
na
tio
na
l D
on
or
s /
 O
rg
an
iza
tio
ns
 
Yes 
No 
Not applicable 
Figure 6.1: Ability to obtain service on your own
33
Communities against corruption: Assessment framework and methodological toolkit
B A S E L I N S T I T U T E O N G O V E R N A N C E
Working paper series No.18
 
is the community scorecard (CSC), which combines quan-
titative surveys with village meetings that bring together 
service users and providers to jointly analyse and resolve 
service delivery problems. Citizens are, through the use of 
this tool, empowered to provide immediate feedback to 
service providers in face-to-face meetings (UNDP 2010; 
Transparency International 2011). 
Participation of community members in the CSC exercise 
takes place through a series of sequenced activities. The 
CSC mechanism begins by engaging participants in a situ-
ational analysis of health issues, including community per-
ceptions of quality and access but also promoting awareness 
of their rights and entitlements. Participants then discuss 
the main issues revealed through the situational analysis 
and cluster the information into indicators. Based on the 
findings, participants are divided into groups (gender- and 
age-based) to discuss and suggest what kinds of improve-
ment they desire. The outputs from this sequenced exercise 
are then discussed with service providers.
6.2 Context assessment
6.2.1 Prevailing attitudes among users and health 
service providers
In Ghana, citizens generally described their relationship with 
local government and local service providers as good. It was 
remarked that although the quality of services sometimes 
varies, all groups are treated equally. When asked about 
ease of access to services measured by their ability to ob-
tain the desired service based entirely on their own means, 
responses showed a very positive evaluation of accessibility 
across the full range of institutions. Especially noteworthy, in 
the case of health services 100% of respondents affirmed it 
is possible to obtain services on their own (See Figure 6.1.)
An interesting feature of the research in Ghana was that 
in FGDs, citizen attitudes towards service providers varied 
markedly between social accountability (SA) participants 
and the control group. In the latter, several participants re-
ported that community members are generally concerned 
that criticizing the ruling party or being identified with the 
opposition can result in health services being taken away 
from the community. In contrast, FGD participants in the 
SA group expressed not fearing that public services could 
be taken away and were emphatic about their fundamental 
right to the provision of quality services. Participants in the 
SA group also expressed they feel motivated to demand their 
right to health services in all areas of public service provi-
sion. In addition, SA group participants explicitly expressed 
feeling empowered by the knowledge acquired through the 
CSC trainings and that this information has now enabled 
them to play a proactive role in the community, clarifying 
and explaining issues to other community members. In the 
control group, although participants gave overall positive as-
sessments regarding service quality, they at the same time 
expressed concerns regarding the prevalence of corruption. 
In turn, during interviews with health staff, several com-
plained about the attitudes of patients. Especially they re-
ferred to the problem of patients getting very angry and 
accusing health staff of corruption when the medicines that 
they should be receiving are not in stock. Service providers 
expressed frustration at the lack of understanding of their 
situation on the part of users and furthermore the aggressive 
behaviours that they sometimes have to confront.
The research revealed a complex picture in terms of the 
kind of relationship prevailing between citizens and service 
providers. There were elements that can be associated with 
the disrupted model such as mentions of corruption, fear 
of reprisals and conflictive attitudes. However, there were 
also elements to suggest that such predispositions can be 
transformed as evidenced by the SA participants’ attitudes, 
such as empowerment and motivation, that are more char-
acteristic of the cooperative model.
6.2.2 Contextual determinants of citizens’ attitudes
A first finding in this cluster of indicators showed that trust 
in institutions is relatively high (See Figure 6.2.). Survey re-
spondents assigned highest trust to state institutions, es-
pecially those in the health sector. Moderately high levels 
of trust were given to traditional institutions such as the 
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community assembly and community chiefs. In contrast, 
trust was relatively low for institutions and organizations 
at the local level such as CSOs, Community Based Organi-
zations (CBOs) and self-help networks.  Interestingly, the 
Ghanaian case illustrates how local power relations can 
shape participatory practices. In these communities, citi-
zens, authorities and service providers alike identified the 
community assembly as the most inclusive instance, where 
all citizens have the opportunity to engage in discussions 
relevant to community-wide affairs such as health, educa-
tion, environmental sanitation, and unemployment. However, 
some informants pointed to some elements that question 
the assemblies’ characterisation as democratic institutions. 
Some respondents underscored that before issues come to 
the assembly, they have to first be discussed by the chief, 
the council of elders and the town development committee. 
These authorities, as agenda setters for community assembly 
meetings, thus exercise significant influence. Furthermore, 
the FGDs also confirmed that the community assemblies 
are not necessarily the venues where decisions are taken. 
Some participants said that family heads and members of 
the council of elders are sometimes called to discuss and 
agree on issues privately, whereas the rest of the commu-
nity is simply informed of their decisions afterwards. Taken 
together, these elements may provide a partial explanation 
for why, in spite of it being the main venue for the commu-
nity to get together and discuss common challenges, com-
munity assemblies are not indicated among the institutions 
receiving highest trust responses in the survey. 
Ghanaian FGD participants unanimously characterized their 
social interactions as communitarian. For them, being com-
munity members was defined as having an attachment to 
the place they live in, sharing interests, and feeling proud 
Figure 6.2.: Trust in istitutions
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vis-à-vis other communities when one’s own is doing well. 
Participants characterized social relationships prevailing 
in the community as based on reciprocity and collective 
decision-making. Numerous examples were given of cases 
where mutual help networks are activated when a commu-
nity member finds him or herself in need (same in the case 
of illness, sudden death or where a child who is deemed to 
be intelligent has no resources to go to school). Participation 
in voluntary associations appears to be high; 95% of survey 
respondents reported being active in at least one type of 
association, with the highest participation rates associated 
with faith based organizations (40% of respondents).
The evidence brought forward suggests that the main ele-
ments associated with social capital (institutional trust, high 
participation levels, and communitarian outlook) are present 
in the communities assessed. This suggests a good founda-
tion for developing collective action initiatives, which in turn 
may be linked to some recorded positive impacts of the so-
cial accountability initiative. In fact, during the FGDs some of 
the participants highlighted the fact that positive results can 
already be observed. Since the training took place, partici-
pants said that the relationship between the health centre 
management and community leaders has improved visibly. 
Some concrete results include that the health centre now 
has an open door policy where community representatives 
have the opportunity to visit the facility to discuss matters 
of public concern. Another positive fact is that the Nana of 
Bisease was personally involved in the CSC exercise and 
participated together with the community representative in 
the meeting with the health facility management.
6.2.3 Service providers’ incentives
Inadequate funding of the health sector remains a significant 
problem in Ghana. Resource scarcity affects the District 
Health directorate and, according to the District Director 
of Ghana Health Service (GHS), this situation besides im-
peding the required supervision and monitoring of health 
service providers, also affects funding for human resourc-
es, infrastructure and medical equipment. Systemic under-
funding generates situations where health facility staff are 
unable to deliver services as stipulated in the formal rules 
and regulations both because of the work load and because 
they lack adequate supplies. 
The problem has been exacerbated by a substantial increase 
in demand for health services since the NHIS has been rolled 
out, while at the same time resources have remained at the 
same level. Consequently, health facility staff, in practice, 
frequently need to devise strategies to cope with the situa-
tions that arise out of the resource scarcity. For instance, it 
has been reported that health workers often deal with stock 
outs of essential drugs by prescribing these medicines to be 
bought privately. This kind of situation naturally generates 
tensions between medical staff and patients, the latter feel-
ing aggravated for having to pay for medicines that should 
be provided free of charge under the NHIS. 
While resource scarcity in and of itself does not need to en-
tail corruption risks, in the case of Ghana it does become 
problematic to the extent that it is compounded with the 
fact that there are no performance-based mechanisms to 
sanction wrong doing or inadequate performance of health 
staff. Furthermore, the evidence brought about during the 
research does not suggest that social capital and cross 
cutting social networks are providing the type of normative 
constraints to providers’ actions as observed, for example, 
in the case of Philippines. 
6.2.4 Strategies to obtain public services
NHIS formal feedback mechanisms are a suggestion box 
at the District NHIS office, periodic general education on 
the radio including call-ins by clients on their experiences 
at health facilities, and a National Call Centre in Accra to 
receive feedback and complains from clients. The NHIS also 
uses community assemblies to receive feedback from users. 
However, evidence obtained through the research suggested 
that, generally speaking, these formal mechanisms are not 
perceived as effective means through which to address prob-
lems with service provision. FGD participants in the control 
group considered that even though there is a suggestion 
box, and people are aware of its existence, it is not a rele-
vant mechanism for handling complaints because people 
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fear the mechanism is not sufficiently anonymous and the 
nurse can retaliate against them. Another reason cited for 
the ineffectiveness of the complaints box as a feedback 
mechanism is that many people are illiterate.
A further somewhat formalized feedback mechanism goes 
through the traditional authorities. According to the Bisease 
Chief, the community had agreed that they would report in-
cidents of corruption to him or to the assemblymen, but he 
also added that in the last two years no reports have been 
received, suggesting that this reporting mechanism is not 
very effective.
In contrast, results from the survey confirmed the prefer-
ence of users to pursue informal mechanisms to address 
problems with service provision. Figure 6.3. presents the 
results of the survey when respondents were asked about 
preferred problem resolution strategies. What is striking 
about this result is the fact that less than 5% of respondents 
feel that denouncing the disservice to competent authori-
ties is the best way to deal with deficient service provision. 
Rather, the overwhelmingly preferred strategies chosen by 
survey respondents are informal: 42% chose intervention of 
an influential person, 31% chose trying several times and 
14% chose payment of an informal fee. 
Tellingly, FGD participants in the group that received the 
CSC training demonstrated a comprehensive understand-
ing of the different alternatives citizens could resort to in 
order to address problems with provision of public services 
and could enumerate several mechanisms through which a 
community member may deal with bad service.
Figure 6.3: Strategies for problem solving
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6.3 Project overview: Strengths, 
challenges and suggestions
In Ghana, evidence from the research suggests that the 
training methodologies employed in the GII-SA project have 
been effective in communicating essential information on 
rights and entitlements, which is the first required step to 
enable effective citizen participation in social accountabili-
ty actions. In a context where a sizeable percentage of the 
population is illiterate, interactive trainings are a suitable 
tool for citizen empowerment as opposed to other strate-
gies that had been previously pursued. 
The CSC methodology has the advantage that it involves 
citizen participants, not only in conducting the assessment 
on the quality of health services, but also in discussing, an-
alysing and aggregating the findings. The research suggests 
that the elements associated to social capital are present, 
thus suggesting that collective action should be feasible, 
especially when citizens can observe the impact of their 
actions. However, one issue that remains to be addressed 
to further harness the impact of the CSC is that it is not 
clear how to relay the relevant information to those NHIS 
authorities at the central level that have the decision mak-
ing powers to address problems identified. This is especially 
problematic with regards to those having to do with inade-
quate medicine supplies and delays in reimbursements to 
the health facilities.
The problem of lack of adequate monitoring of service pro-
viders is another concern in the Ghanaian health system, 
where accountability lines flow upwards and where, as rec-
ognized by the NHIS district manager, sanctions for wrong 
doing are very rarely applied. Therefore, in order to fully 
realize the potential of the social accountability actions a 
dialogue could be pursued probing the feasibility of intro-
ducing changes that could somehow link the incentives of 
service providers to performance.
An additional element that impedes enforcing sanctions in 
cases of corruption is when the victims of such acts are not 
forthcoming in denouncing them. The field research sug-
gested there is an unwillingness to talk about corrupt acts 
in these communities. In view of that, strengthening the 
educational activities explaining the meaning of corruption 
and illustrating its effects could be helpful.
A possible strategy to strengthen the impact of the overall 
CSC initiative would be to more proactively involve service 
providers. A worker at the Bisease health center complained 
that the medical staff have not received training on the CSC 
and were therefore uncertain about the aims and scope of 
the initiative.
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7. Matching social accountabil-
ity tools to context
7.1 Types of social accountability approaches: disaggregated by 
program component
7.1.1 Capacity building7Fussnote dient nur zur Formatierung
Type of approach Direct/ Personalised Indirect/ Impersonal
General description Information on mandate, rights, entitlements 
and social accountability approach commu-
nicated directly to citizens, typically in rela-
tively small groups and in an intensive fashion 
(trainings, workshops). 
Information on mandate, rights, entitlements 
and social accountability approach disseminat-
ed through publicly accessible material (print, 
online, media, social media).
Contextual elements 
associated with ef-
fectiveness of ap-
proach 
• Communitarian settings
• Presence of horizontal networks
• Smaller-populations targeted. 
• Rural communities
• Urban neighbourhoods with high 
levels of local participatory ac-
tivity
• Settings where individualistic social interac-
tion patterns dominate.
• Weak civil society and absence of horizontal 
networks
• Larger-populations targeted
• Large regions
• Urban contexts with weak participa-
toryactivity
7 The definitions and descriptions of the different tools included in section 7.2. have been taken from World Bank, Social Development Department, Social 
Accountability Sourcebook http://www.worldbank.org/socialaccountability_sourcebook/Tools/toolsindex.html and from UNDP (2010).
This section provides insights to guide the implementer on 
how to link the characteristics of the target communities 
to a social accountability tool that is suitable for the spe-
cific context.
On the basis that there is no one size-fits-all social account-
ability tool, the arguments made in this section are meant to 
be illustrative of how knowledge about the characteristics 
of the local context may be harnessed to customize the so-
cial accountability approach to the greatest extent possible. 
Following the analytical framework described in section 2, 
section 7.1 describes different approaches to operational-
ize each of the social accountability program components, 
discusses their suitability for different contexts, as well as 
relative strengths and weaknesses, and offers examples 
of established social accountability tools representative of 
each category. 
For illustrative purposes section 7.2 provides a more de-
tailed description of three specific social accountability 
approaches: participatory budgeting, citizen report cards 
and citizen score cards. These three specific modalities of 
social accountability are among the best known and most 
widely used tools and have been selected after an extensive 
review of several sources on the topic.7 
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Strengths • Provides very detailed knowledge and thus 
can empower recipients to engage in more 
complex and potentially more far-reaching 
anti-corruption activities.
• Citizen empowerment maximised.
• Can reach a potentially large number of cit-
izens.
• Convenient access, does not require signifi-
cant time or energy commitment on the part 
of citizens.
Challenges • Can only reach a limited number of cit-
izens. BUT can generate positive spill-
over effects throughout the community 
when applied in a context characterized 
by dense horizontal networks.
• Requires significant time and energy com-
mitment from participating citizens.
• The amount of information communicated 
is limited.
• Empowerment constrained by the limitations 
in the amount of information that may be 
communicated.
Examples Trainings associated with:
• Participatory budgeting
• Community scorecards
• Citizen monitoring activities
• Citizens’ Charters
• Transparency portals
• Education campaigns
7.1.2 Citizen participation modalities
Type of approach Collective inputs Individual inputs
General description The social accountability program requires 
collective and coordinated mobilization of cit-
izens (group actions).
Enables citizens themselves to be in charge 
of aggregating and articulating voice.  
Citizens participate in the social accountability 
program providing their inputs on an individual 
basis.
A third party is required to aggregate and artic-
ulate citizens’ inputs (generally NGOs or CSOs).
Contextual elements 
associated with effec-
tiveness of approach
Most pertinent for smaller communities (rural 
or strong urban neighbourhoods).
Significant collective action capabilities re-
quired:
• High local participatory activity
• Communitarian orientation helps BUT not 
strictly necessary when dense horizontal 
networks exist.
Most pertinent for larger communities (large ur-
ban agglomerations).
Appropriate for contexts where collective action 
capabilities are weak:
• Low participation in voluntary associations
• Individualistic orientation to problem solving.
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Strengths • Increases detail and scope of the informa-
tion generated. 
• Best for citizen empowerment as individ-
uals working together increases social 
capital.
• Protects anonymity where there are fears of 
reprisals
• Limited time investment required; conve-
nience.
Challenges • Requires significant time and energy in-
vestment.
• Information is limited and quality thereof may 
be questionable.
Examples •  Citizen monitoring activities
•  Community Scorecards
•  Participatory budgeting
• Complaints and whistle-blower’s mecha-
nisms:
•  SMS reporting
•  Online reporting
•  Official complaint management sys-
tems
•  Citizen report cards
7.1.3 Transmission of Voice to State Actors
Type of approach Direct Indirect
General description The outputs from the participatory activities 
are relayed directly to state actors; particular-
ly relevant are those who have decision-mak-
ing abilities to act upon the information re-
ceived.
The outputs from the participatory activities are 
disseminated through public channels. 
Contextual elements 
associated with effec-
tiveness of approach
Citizens trust government officials and/or 
service providers.
Political will and responsiveness on the part 
of public sector officials.
Other actors (media, NGOs) that are trusted in 
the community have a relevant role to play when 
trust in state actors is weak.
Pertinent when links to state institutions are weak 
and/or when there is limited responsiveness on 
the part of the relevant state officials.
Strengths Most effective means to establish a working 
relationship between citizens and state actors 
and to generate the conditions necessary for 
the exercise of direct accountability. 
Increased visibility and awareness among pub-
lic opinion about the issues uncovered by social 
accountability mechanism can raise the stakes 
of not addressing them on the part of key deci-
sion makers.
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Challenges May require strategic decision-making about 
which state actors to engage as a function of 
ability to act upon information and respon-
siveness.
Uncertain impact on state actors’ incentives. 
Examples • Community score card
• Participatory budgeting
• Citizen report card
• Media coverage, press release, NGO/CSO 
webpage, community meetings.
7.1.4 Enforcement mechanisms
Type of approach Formal Informal
General description Key incentives of service providers are directly 
linked to citizen evaluations through institu-
tionalized and officially recognized mecha-
nisms.
Service providers’ incentives are inked to citizens’ 
evaluations through informal means. (Social sta-
tus, prestige). 
Contextual elements 
associated with effec-
tiveness of approach
Significant political will often be required at 
higher levels of public office in order to push 
through legal and formal institutional reforms.
Embeddedness of local government officials and 
public service providers.
Cooperative dispositions on the part of service 
providers and/or local government officials.
Strengths Provides solid institutional backing to the de-
velopment and consolidation of strong cor-
ruption deterrence mechanisms. 
Creates strong links between communities and 
their service providers.
Challenges May involve politically difficult reforms to the 
legal and regulatory framework.
Difficult to scale up.
Effectiveness, at least in the short to medium 
terms, will likely depend on the sustainability of 
the social accountability scheme.
Examples • Pay for performance (P4P) schemes, per-
formance-based bonuses. 
• Explicit and consistently enforced sanc-
tions for engaging in corrupt actions.
• Citizen report cards
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7.1.5 Answerability and feedback mechanisms
Type of approach Direct Indirect
General description Citizens are directly informed of the manner in 
which the information produced by the social 
accountability scheme will be acted upon.
Information and updates on the outputs and 
expected results of the social accountability 
scheme have been taken up by public officials are 
disseminated through publicly accessible means.
Contextual elements 
associated with effec-
tiveness of approach
Smaller communities. Large populations, urban settings.
Strengths High potential for empowerment and sustain-
ability as social accountability participants 
can directly observe and assess the impacts 
of their actions and the benefits of collective 
action.
Increases visibility and, when displaying the re-
sults of successful social accountability initia-
tives, can incentivize other communities or ap-
plication to other sectors.
Challenges Requires greater investment of time and re-
sources on both the demand and supply sides 
in order to coordinate meetings and sustain 
the scheme.
Access to information may be limited among 
intended beneficiaries especially among low-in-
come groups (lack of internet access, illiteracy).
More loosely linked to sustainability
Examples • Public hearings
• Town hall meetings
• Web-based feedback mechanism
• Media
7.2 Selected social accountabili-
ty programmes8
7.2.1 Participatory budgeting
Participatory Budgeting (PB) is broadly defined as a mecha-
nism or process through which citizens participate directly 
8 The program descriptions included in this section have been taken from 
the following source: World Bank, Social Development Department, 
Social Accountability Sourcebook http://www.worldbank.org/socialac-
countability_sourcebook/Tools/toolsindex.html
in the different phases of the budget formulation, decision 
making, and monitoring of budget execution. PB can be in-
strumental in increasing public expenditure transparency 
and in improving budget targeting. Since it is a useful ve-
hicle to promote civic engagement and social learning, PB 
has been referred to as an effective “School of Citizenship”.
In most cases, the PB process is organized around the annual 
or multi-year public budgeting process as follows:
The participatory process cycle usually starts with region-
al meetings, which are public hearings organized in small 
43
Communities against corruption: Assessment framework and methodological toolkit
B A S E L I N S T I T U T E O N G O V E R N A N C E
Working paper series No.18
 
sub-divisions of the administrative territorial units, to bring 
the PB process closer to the citizens. Government represen-
tatives use these meetings to inform citizens about the PB 
rules and procedures, provide an update of current budget 
execution, and share government priorities and revenue 
forecasts. A second round of meetings is organized to en-
able citizens to identify their priorities and elect delegates 
to represent their concerns in the Participatory Budgeting 
Council. Community organizations meet independently to 
inform citizens about the PB activities, raise awareness, and 
mobilize participation around specific priorities.
The elected delegates and government representatives form 
the Participatory Budgeting Council (PBC). The PBC has the 
mandate to negotiate all priorities voted during the regional 
meetings, and prepare the final participatory budgeting pro-
posal. The citizen delegates participate in capacity building 
activities to become more familiar with public expenditure 
management and to enhance conflict resolution skills. The 
delegates carry out field visits (PB caravans), to inspect all 
priorities. In parallel, the government carries out technical 
and financial feasibility studies for each proposal.
After a series of debates in the legislative council, a final 
PB proposal is presented officially to the Mayor. The May-
or submits the PB proposal to the Municipal Council who 
usually holds the legal mandate to approve the government 
budget. The legislative process is accompanied by strong 
social mobilization and active engagement by PB delegates 
to ensure that the final budget text approved by the legisla-
ture fully reflects the PBC deliberations.
Once the budget is approved, a PB monitoring committee 
is established to ensure oversight of the procurement and 
budget execution processes.
Communication, Information and Capacity Building:
Effective communication strategies, access to information, 
and capacity building have a direct impact on the quality of 
participation, and on the overall success of the PB process. 
Informed citizens are the key to a successful PB process. 
Systematic and creative public campaigns can be conduct-
ed through the local press, vehicles with speakers, mass 
mailings, posters, leaflets, outdoor meetings, television, 
public and cultural institutions, theatre and role playing ac-
tivities. Such campaigns raise civic awareness and provide 
citizens with a better understanding of the budget process 
and fiscal situation.
At the same time, government officials need to be prepared 
to coordinate, support and facilitate the PB process effec-
tively. While this might involve considerable efforts particu-
larly in large municipalities, smaller local governments face 
greater challenges in providing their citizens with reliable, 
timely, and user-friendly information.
What are the resources required?
PB has been implemented with high degrees of sophisti-
cation, including professional communication campaigns 
and skilled facilitators for public meetings. It has also been 
applied with limited resources in rural settings where there 
are scarce human, technical and financial resources. Many 
municipalities can make use of their own staff and commu-
nication channels to conduct a PB exercise. Nevertheless, 
it is fundamental that the process is sustained by reliable 
information dissemination about the budget forecasts and 
execution, and continuous public campaigns about PB ac-
tivities and results.
Where has participatory budgeting been implemented?
 PB was pioneered at the municipal level in Brazil in the late 
1980s, when the country was experiencing unprecedented 
social mobilization for re-democratization and decentraliza-
tion. At the same time, there was a crisis of government 
credibility. Some newly elected mayors facing serious fis-
cal constraints and high citizen discontentment with public 
services realized that engaging citizens in difficult decision 
making about resources could improve their poor public 
image. By 2000, approximately 140 municipalities in Brazil 
had adopted PB. Of these municipalities, 28 per cent had 
fewer than 20,000 inhabitants, 32 per cent had between 
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20,000 and 100,000, 31 per cent had between 100,000 and 
500,000, and 9 per cent had over a half-million inhabitants.1 
While PB has been implemented in Brazil for several years, 
different forms of participatory budgeting can be found to-
day in many countries, including Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, 
Chile, Peru, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, El Salvador, 
Mexico, Spain, Italy, Germany, France, Belgium, Portugal, 
Switzerland, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Portugal, 
Switzerland, Cameroon, India, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, South 
Africa, and the Philippines. Most PB experiences are at the 
urban and rural municipal levels. Some provincial govern-
ments have recently introduced PB in Latin America.
Strengths
Because participation in the PB process exposes citizens to 
all aspects of the budgeting cycle in their local government, 
this approach maximises the ability of citizens to identify ir-
regular actions on the part of local government authorities. 
The presence of empowered citizens thus, in this manner, 
drastically reduces the opportunity space for corrupt actions.
Popular inputs in the definition of priorities for budget alloca-
tions have been associated with effective poverty alleviation 
outcomes and more inclusionary public policies.
Because PB involves intense interaction between citizen and 
local government officials it is an effective trust building ac-
tivity and supports the development of an active interface 
between the state and civil society.
Challenges
Although PB has been widely disseminated, the mechanism 
is not a silver bullet that solves all management and gov-
ernance problems. There are a number of challenges that 
governments have encountered when implementing PB. 
These challenges need to be carefully managed:
Raising false expectations: When the government is not 
transparent about fiscal information or cannot provide a 
budget forecast, citizens are unaware of the fiscal con-
straints and can demand services and goods that the gov-
ernment is not able to deliver. In many cases, governments 
have not been able to execute the PB process due to poor 
financial management, creating tensions that have under-
mined the sustainability of PB as a whole.
Quality of participation: It is often challenging to include the 
most marginalized groups, the middle-income classes, aca-
demia, and the private sector. The middle classes and the 
private sector usually have good access to public services 
and thus do not see the value added in PB activities. Mar-
ginalized groups often encounter a high cost to participating 
in PB (mainly in time and transportation). The knowledge 
disparities between the poor and the wealthy also affect the 
quality of participation and equity of final budget priorities. 
Avoiding civil society co-optation: The autonomy of civil so-
ciety organizations can be undermined if PB practices are 
misused to increase clientelism. 
Overextending government capacity: The government needs 
to invest resources and time to organize the PB activities and 
provide budget information. However, many governments 
lack the capacity to undertake these activities. 
Tension with elected representatives: Tension is often voiced 
by elected members of the legislature who fear losing their 
power as citizens’ representatives. As the budget arrives in 
the Municipal Council with a substantial degree of popular 
legitimacy, some legislators fear that their role in the bud-
geting process becomes a mere formality. 
Sustainability: Citizens have a tendency to abandon PB pro-
cesses after their demands have been met. Election periods 
usually undermine the quality of participation as discussions 
turn into political debates. Opposition parties are also less 
keen to mobilize their constituencies and support the PB 
process. Political changes in the administrations can poten-
tially disrupt the PB process, particularly when PB is used 
as a political tool.
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7.2.2 Citizen report cards
Citizen report cards (CRCs) are used in situations where 
demand side data, such as user perceptions on quality and 
satisfaction with public services is absent. By systematically 
gathering and disseminating public feedback, CRCs serve 
as a “surrogate for competition” for state-owned monop-
olies that lack the incentive to be as responsive as private 
enterprises to their client’s needs. They are a useful me-
dium through which citizens can credibly and collectively 
‘signal’ to agencies about their performance and advocate 
for change.
Specific CRC methodologies may vary depending on the lo-
cal context. A clear pre-requisite is the availability of local 
technical capacity to develop the questionnaires, conduct 
the surveys and analyse results. There are some basic steps 
that apply to all CRC methodologies:
• Deciding on agencies/ services to be evaluated;
• Identification of scope and key actors that will be in-
volved;
• Design of questionnaires in a manner that is simple 
enough for ordinary citizens to understand;
• Careful demographic assessment to select the appro-
priate sample and size for survey;
• Raising awareness of the survey respondents to the 
process;
• Providing training to the individuals involved in conduct-
ing the survey;
• Analysing the data: compilation and analysis of the re-
sponses to survey questionnaires;
• Dissemination of findings with due consideration of the 
power relationships and political economy of the situ-
ation; and,
• Institutionalizing the process of providing citizen feed-
back to service providers on a periodic basis. 
Resources required
The main costs associated with CRCs include the prepara-
tion of the questionnaire, the actual execution of the survey; 
data compilation and analysis, information dissemination, 
and mobilizing citizen groups to actively engage with agen-
cies to work on improvement of service quality.
Strengths
• CRCs can be used to assess either one public service 
or several services simultaneously.
• The feedback can be collected from a large population 
through careful sampling.
• CRCs are quite technical and thus there may not be a 
need for a major citizen mobilization effort to get the 
process started. 
• Perceived improvements in service quality can be com-
pared over time or across various public agencies in-
volved in service provision.
Challenges
• CRCs require a well thought out dissemination strategy 
so that public agencies take note of citizen feedback 
and take the required action to correct weaknesses.
• In locations where there is not much technical capacity, 
CRCs may be difficult to design and implement.
• If there is an error in sampling, the quality of service may 
not be reflected in the survey results.
7.2.3 Community score cards
The community score card (CSC) process is a communi-
ty-based monitoring tool that is a hybrid of the techniques 
of social audit and citizen report cards. Like the citizen re-
port card, the CSC process is an instrument to exact social 
and public accountability and responsiveness from service 
providers. By linking service providers to the community, 
citizens are empowered to provide immediate feedback to 
service providers.
The CSC process uses the “community” as its unit of analy-
sis, and is focused on monitoring at the local/facility levels. 
It facilitates community monitoring and performance evalu-
ation of services, projects and even government administra-
tive units (like district assemblies). Since it is a grassroots 
process, it is also more likely to be of use in a rural setting.
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The CSC solicits user perceptions on quality, efficiency and 
transparency. This includes:
• Tracking inputs or expenditures (e.g. availability of drugs);
• Monitoring the quality of services/projects;
• Generating benchmark performance criteria that can 
be used in resource allocation and budget decisions;
• Comparing performance across facilities/districts;
• Generating direct feedback mechanisms between pro-
viders and users;
• Building local capacity, and strengthening citizen voice 
and community empowerment.
What are the resources required?
The main costs include the preparatory ground work, and 
conducting focus group discussions. Careful thought needs 
to be given to the cost of information dissemination and mo-
bilizing citizen groups to actively engage with agencies to 
work on improvement of service quality. The cost will also 
depend on the country in which this is being applied and 
whether the activity is conducted in urban or rural areas.
Strengths
• This approach can be conducted for one public service 
or several services simultaneously. 
• This is a community level process bringing together 
service providers and users to discuss possible ways of 
improving service quality. 
• Perceived improvements in service quality can be com-
pared over time or across various public agencies in-
volved in service provision.
Challenges
• CSCs rely on good quality facilitators, which may not 
always be available. 
• Reaching out to stakeholders before beginning the score-
card process is critical, but may not always be feasible. 
• In locations where there is not much local technical ca-
pacity, CSCs could be difficult to design and implement. 
• CSCs cannot be easily applied to large geographical 
areas.
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The experiences from Serbia, Philippines and Ghana illus-
trate a diversity of initial conditions for the establishment of 
participatory initiatives targeting corruption in the delivery 
of essential public services and shed light into the manner 
in which challenges to social accountability are strongly 
determined by the context. 
The purpose of the assessment methodology presented 
here is to gain an understanding of the conditions affecting 
the choices made by citizens when they interact with public 
service providers and, especially, when they are faced with 
corrupt actions. By structuring the social accountability in-
tervention taking into account the perspective of potential 
users, it is expected that citizen uptake and sustainability 
will be optimised. The goal is to make participating as easy 
as possible, ideally providing an alternative to conventional 
complaints mechanisms that can be perceived as both safe 
and effective for the users.
Thus, adopting a social accountability approach that in-
volves a direct dialogue between government officials, ser-
vice providers and citizens is feasible in contexts where a 
significant degree of trust among the stakeholders involved 
is already present as in the cases of the Philippines and 
Ghana. In contrast, where trust is low and fear of reprisals 
is prevalent, as in Serbia, an anonymous reporting mech-
anism, ideally handled by a neutral third party (such as a 
CSO), will be more appropriate. 
Differences between rural and urban areas also play a role 
in developing context sensitive approaches. In rural areas, 
as in the Philippines and Ghana, traditional social structures 
(such as community assemblies) often play an important role 
in fostering social capital, and therefore the decision making 
process involved in community gatherings may be incorpo-
rated into the intervention. In urban areas, such as Belgrade, 
this becomes more difficult due to the coexistence of het-
erogeneous social structures typical of modern cities and 
the sheer population numbers involved. To further validate 
this finding, future research could apply the methodology 
to other urban contexts in different geographical regions.
The cases also demonstrate how establishing social ac-
countability strategies can play a key role in addressing 
the dilemmas that arise in contexts characterized by re-
source constraints. Such situations often create a fertile 
environment for corrupt acts to take place. Thus, raising 
awareness and enabling a dialogue between citizens and 
service providers to promote understanding about those 
resource constraints and their implications for quality of 
services is a first step to take away the veil of secrecy that 
enables corruption to become a mechanism to distribute 
scarce resources.
Social accountability cannot be understood as a silver bullet 
in the fight against corruption. The discussion of the case 
studies also illustrates the limits of participatory approaches, 
especially when it comes to the very key aspect of enforce-
ability. Without sanctions, accountability has no meaning. 
Voice can only go so far if it fails to generate any costs for 
the wrongdoers. Triggering sanctions to service providers 
who engage in corrupt actions can only become a signifi-
cant constraint when there is a) an institutional framework 
that regulates when and how sanctions are in order and b) 
political will to actually enforce it. 
For the aforementioned reason, an emphasis should be made 
on designing social accountability approaches that consider 
the engagement with state institutions and government of-
ficials in a regular and predictable manner as an important 
element. In other words, defining institutional mechanisms 
through which voice, enforcement and answerability may 
become functional and link up to enable information flows 
across the full social accountability cycle should be an es-
sential aspect of developing a holistic citizen participatory 
intervention. 
In this sense, the assessed projects in Serbia and Ghana 
shared a significant weakness because of the absence of 
well defined procedures to relay information to government 
decision makers, which needs to be seen in the context of a 
systemic absence of functional institutional structures link-
ing citizens’ inputs to the state. The Philippine case is a rare
8. Lessons learned
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 exception in this regard because, due to the extraordinarily 
close relationship between the LGU and the communities 
of San Miguel, feedback and answerability in the BUHLON 
project are streamlined through the direct involvement of 
the mayor and key members of the LGU during the various 
stages of the monitoring exercise. In San Miguel, voice 
and answerability are linked up almost simultaneously and 
enforceability is assured through the high levels of trans-
parency and embeddedness with which the LGU operates.
In sum, the conceptual framework and assessment tools 
that are proposed in this report seek to provide practitioners 
with a structured methodology to obtain information about 
the context in order to support the strengthening of social 
accountability initiatives geared at containing corrupt prac-
tices in essential public services. The information that the 
methodology yields may also be used to establish baseline 
data upon which progress and impact may be measured at 
a later point in time. 
The indicators we propose focus on the resources available 
to communities to embark on collective action and on citizen 
empowerment. By emphasizing these elements it is hoped 
that more nuanced attention may be given to the deep pro-
cess of transforming the relationship between states and 
their constituents from one of clientelistic co-optation to one 
of an egalitarian exercise of rights and freedoms, which is 
ultimately the foundation of robust democratic governance.
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This methodology is the result of several years of academic 
research on the topic of social accountability undertaken by 
the Public Governance Division at the Basel Institute on Gov-
ernance. In its final version, the methodology is the output 
from two distinct research stages. The first stage consisted 
of in-depth ethnographic research conducted in the frame-
work of the Basel Institute’s participation in the EU-funded 
ANTICORRP research consortium. This initial research stage, 
which involved research in Mexico and Tanzania, contrib-
uted evidence about the dimensions that are important to 
determine the collective action capabilities of different com-
munities and helped to narrow down on the variables to be 
included in the assessment. The second stage involved the 
application of the streamlined methodology to a new set of 
cases. This was undertaken in collaboration with UNDP’s 
Global Programme on Anti-Corruption (PACDE) and involved 
assessing three social accountability initiatives supported 
by PACDE in the Philippines, Serbia and Ghana. After the 
second stage of research activities, the methodology was 
further refined for ease of use and improved validity. 
The methodology consists of a sequential mixed-methods 
design. In a first step, the survey is applied in order to obtain 
a first approximation of the characteristics of the communi-
ty in question. In a second step and building on the survey 
findings, focus group discussions and semi-structured inter-
views are conducted to capture more detailed information 
dealing with the most relevant dimensions of the analysis 
and to validate the survey findings. At the same time, the 
focus groups and interviews present an opportunity for the 
researcher to inquire with greater depth on issues revealed 
by the survey requiring clarification and to further explore 
inconclusive findings.
With regards to the sampling, adopting a purposive sam-
pling strategy is recommended. Although this implies that 
the sample will not be representative of the population as 
a whole, the choice is justified because of the nature of 
the inquiry. Social accountability interventions have often 
been criticized for working to empower groups within their 
respective communities that may have a privileged posi-
tion to begin with. Thus, as the basis for developing an 
adequate social accountability intervention and in order to 
avoid reinforcing or even worsening power disparities at the 
community level, it is important to make clear decisions in 
advance to deliberately target those specific groups whose 
inclusion and engagement with the participatory mechanism 
is deemed most relevant. Examples include members of 
minority groups, the elderly, women of reproductive age, 
etc. By making such a priori decisions on the groups that 
the initiative aims to engage, it is then possible to better 
tailor the research tools, including decisions on sampling, 
in order to make sure that the positions and perceptions of 
the priority groups are well accounted for in the research. 
Narrowing down the focus of the research in this manner 
decreases measurement error vis-à-vis the indicators asso-
ciated to the priority groups and therefore serves as a way 
to maximise the effectiveness of the intervention. 
Thus, before initiating the process of tailoring the tools for 
the assessment, implementers are encouraged to think 
about those groups within the target communities that are 
most likely to profit from participating in a social account-
ability scheme. This initial decision should inform subsequent 
ones on sampling, the composition of the focus groups, as 
well as tailoring the interview questionnaires.
The outputs from the assessment are not intended to be 
quantitative indexes, partly because the nature of the as-
sessment implies that the complexity of the dimensions 
studied does not lend itself to being depicted through a 
numerical value without losing its meaning. For this reason, 
comparability across cases can be undertaken by means of 
application of this assessment but is to be of a qualitative 
rather than a quantitative nature.
9. Annexes: Assessment tools 
and methodological notes
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9.1 Annex 1 Survey: Institutional performance and social values
We are undertaking a study to understand citizen’s perceptions and experiences in accessing public services. We invite 
you to participate in this study by answering this survey. Your participation is entirely voluntary and we assure you of the 
strict confidentiality and anonymity with which the results of the survey will be handled. None of the answers you provide 
to the survey will be directly attributable to you. 
1. Sex           F ◻       M ◻
2. Age _____
3. Education level _______________________________
a) Primary ◻          b) Secondary ◻          c) High School ◻          d) College degree ◻         e) None ◻
4. Occupation __________________________________
5. Rate the following institutions according to how important they are for the wellbeing of your community. Please indicate 
among the listed institutions which one you feel is the most important for your family’s wellbeing.  
Institutions* Not important Fairly important Very important Most important
Municipal Government
Ruling political parties in the coalition 
government
Opposition parties
Ministry of Health
Ombudsman office
Unions
Health care providers
Health Insurance Fund
* This list should be tailored according to the sector in which the social accountability initiative is being implemented. This template depicts the survey as 
applied to a study in the health sector. The same criteria to adapt to national and sectorial contexts should be applied throughout the survey.
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Health Inspectorate
Religious authorities
Police
CSOs
Courts/judges
Patient organizations
Rights’ advocacy organizations
Media
International donor organizations
Others (please specify)
6. How much do you trust the following institutions? 
Institution Low trust Indifferent High trust
Municipal Government
Ruling political parties in the coalition government
Opposition parties
Ministry of Health
Ombudsman office
Unions
Health care providers
Health Insurance Fund
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Health Inspectorate
Religious authorities
Police
CSOs
Courts/judges
Patient organizations
Rights’ advocacy organizations
Media
International donor organizations
Others (please specify)
7. With which of the aforementioned institutions do you feel that you are not able to settle a matter/obtain a service on 
your own?
Institution Unable to obtain the desired service on my own
Municipal Government
Ruling political parties in the coalition government
Opposition parties
Ministry of Health
Ombudsman office
Unions
Health care providers
Health Insurance Fund
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Health Inspectorate
Religious authorities
Police
CSOs
Courts/judges
Patient organizations
Rights’ advocacy organizations
Media
International donor organizations
Others (please specify)
8. With your knowledge about how things work in your community which do you think is the best course of action for a 
    person who can’t successfully deal with public institutions to resolve his/her problem? (Choose only one answer):
a) Ask for intervention from a friend
b) Ask for intervention from a relative 
c) Ask for intervention from an important person 
d) Pay a fee 
e) Give a small gift
f) Denounce the disservice: 
(i)   to the management of the institution or office in question through the com-
                       plaint mechanisms 
(ii)  to the local government authorities
(iii)     to the anticorruption agency
(iv) by means of the social accountability tool (if applicable)
(v)  other mechanism (please specify)
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g) Try several times until he/she gets a good result 
h) Avoid in general dealing with that institution 
9. To what extent do you consider corruption to be prevalent in your community?
a) It happens all the time
b) It happens sometimes
c) It seldom happens
d) It never happens
10. How would you characterize the impact of corruption on the welfare of the members of your community?
a) It has significant impact on the community
b) It has some impact on the community
c) It has little impact on the community
d) It has no impact on the community
11. Do you feel you have the means to express dissatisfaction when the treatment received by your local government/
      public service provider is not appropriate? 
      If yes, what are they? 
12. Do you agree the following statement is true?: “gift giving creates a bond where people know they will receive better
      service next time they visit the health centre?”
13. Do you agree the following statement is true?: “the quality of the services obtained is associated to the citizen’s per-
      sonal relationship with the service provider or some other influential person?”
14. When there is a problem with provision of public services (if applicable specify sector/area being targeted), to whom
      would you say community members typically turn to?
a) State authorities (through the responsible sector Ministry or office)
b) Local government authorities
c) Religious leaders
d) CSO’s
e) Family and friends
f) Community assembly/ Town hall meeting
g) People prefer to rely on their own individual means
h) Other
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15. From 1 (not similar) to 6 (very similar) can you tell me how similar to you do you think this person is to you:
      1=not at all like me 2= Not like me 3= A little like me 4= somewhat like me 5=Like me 6= Very much like me
a) He/she lives his life as a fully autonomous individual, trying to rely on other people’s help as little as possible.
b) He/she believes that as long as each person looks after his or her own well being and that of their family good 
                                  social outcomes will be achieved.
c) He/she thinks that traditions should be respected and follows the customs handed down by one’s religion or
                                  family.
d) He/she believes that individuals should adapt their actions to new circumstances regardless of how things were 
                                  done in the past.
e) He/she thinks that strangers should not be accepted in the community if most of the people don’t want so. 
f) He/she thinks that it is important to think up new ideas and be creative, to do things one’s own way. 
g) He/she thinks it is his/her duty to help the people in the community; to care for their well-being.
h) He/she thinks it is important to always avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.
16. Which of the following affirmations do you find most accurate:
a) As citizens we are entitled to basic rights and access to services and nobody can take that away. 
b) We should support the government in order to receive adequate public services
17. Which of the following affirmations do you find most accurate:
a) Our authorities do their best to provide what we need, anything lacking is due to circumstances out of anyone’s 
                                 control
b) The government cannot be trusted to provide for our communities, therefore we should stay away from public 
                                 officers
18. Indicate in which kind(s) of groups you participate regularly and identify them:
a) Groups organized and/or sponsored by international or bilateral development agencies. 
b) Political groups (electoral organizing, political mobilization) 
c) Groups organized by NGOs
d) Organizations based on economic motives (for example, trade unions)
e) Faith-based organizations  
f) Charitable organizations
g) Leisure organizations (sports, hobbies)
h) Self help groups
i) Women’s groups
j) Other
k) I do not participate in any such group
l) Because I do not have any time for it
m) Because I am not interested
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19. People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Please indicate how strongly agree 
or disagree with each of the following statements about how you see yourself.910
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree
a) I see myself as part 
of my local community
1 2 3 4
b) I see myself as part 
of the (…….) nation
1 2 3 4
c) I see myself as an 
autonomous individual
1 2 3 4
20. Choose from the following list the statement that is the most appropriate to you (choose only one)
a) I believe my living conditions can be changed mainly through my actions  
b) I believe only those in power can improve our living conditions
c) I believe only our community as a strong group can improve living conditions 
d) I believe no matter what my actions are our conditions will not improve easily
21. Do you own a mobile phone?
22. Do you own a smart phone?
23. Which of the following social media tools do you use and with what frequency?
I have an account and 
use it every day
I have an account and 
use it at least once a 
week
I have an account but 
rarely use it
I don’t have an ac-
count
Facebook
Twitter 
Instagram 
Google + 
9 This question has been taken from the World Values Survey 2010-2012 Wave, revised master, June 2012 available at:
 http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp
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What’s app
24. Please specify in which of the following areas you would be willing to participate in a project to combat corruption 
in your community:
Area I would be willing to participate
Security (Police) 
Health 
Education
Water  
Land registry 
Electoral fraud 
Youth/Women fund
Other, not listed (please specify) 
9.2 Annex 2 Focus groups discussion guidelines 
For all focus group discussions a project information sheet should be prepared and shared with participants before be-
ginning the exercise. If necessary the information sheet may be read to the prospective participants and the researcher 
must make sure that all questions arising are answered to the satisfaction of the prospective participants. A sample of 
an informed consent form is provided as Annex 6.4.
Topic 1: Do people in your community regularly participate in any forms of collective action?
Describe the main institutions and/or organizations in which you participate and how does participation take place? 
Guiding questions:
• Do you regularly take part in activities where you come together with other citizens? (Formally and informally). If so, 
please describe such activities.
• Who participates in these instances? Do all citizens who have an interest in this area have the ability to participate 
equally or do different groups have different level of access? (Inclusiveness) 
• During those meetings, do you discuss any issues of common concern?
58
Communities against corruption: Assessment framework and methodological toolkit
B A S E L I N S T I T U T E O N G O V E R N A N C E
Working paper series No. 18
 
• If so, how are decisions made during those meetings where you participate? (Consensus, voting, debate) 
• Decisions are taken elsewhere and communicated to the group 
• Leaders decide and inform group of decisions 
• Leaders ask for opinions within group before making a decision 
• All members of the group express their opinions and participate in debate before collectively finding a decision.
• Decisions are voted upon by all/some participant
No cases:
• Why not?
• Inertia
• Apathy
• Fear
• Isolation
• Self-doubt
Topic 2: Allegiance to the group/individualism 
Is the pattern of social interactions is the community characterized by an emphasis on communitarianism or individualism?
Guiding questions:
• Describe what belonging to your community means to you. 
• Do you personally feel a sense of community in your hometown or do you function mostly as an independent individual?
• If you do feel a sense of community, in what ways is this expressed? 
• Does being recognized as community member give you a special standing or confer special benefits as compared to, 
say, a newcomer from a different region?
• In general terms, how easy is it to express dissent (around any topic) in the community? Are opposing views easily 
debated or is open disagreement avoided and other means of resolving conflict pursued?
• When there are problems with the provision of public services is expressing criticism on an individual basis usually a 
good way to obtain answers or rather is some form of collective action more effective?
• Are there examples of cases when the community as a group articulated a demand vis-à-vis the government?
Topic 3: Relationship of the community with public institutions and local government
How do members of the community see their relationship with government and providers of public services?
• Ask participants to describe experiences accessing public services (health, education, legal)
• Describe attitudes of service providers towards the public. 
• Are some groups better treated than others? If yes, under what circumstances? What would explain so? 
• Is the interaction with service providers cordial? Is it easy to communicate with them?
• Are providers of public services considered community members? Do they understand and relate to the needs 
and concerns of community members?
• Do people in the community ever worry that public services or benefits (for example health services) might 
be taken away from them? If so in which cases? (For example, criticizing the local government, affiliation with 
opposition political party, antagonizing local leaders)
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• Do you know what your rights are and what services you are entitled to and the costs associated to them 
when you seek to obtain public services?
• In cases of bad service, how do people usually deal with their unresolved problem? 
• Are people aware of mechanisms available through the government in order to file complaints and provide feedback 
about provision of public services? Are they used? If yes with what results, if not, why not.
• When citizens need to obtain services from the government what is typically the best way to achieve the desired re-
sult, by strictly following the formal protocols or by making use of other informal means, such as for example, asking 
for a recommendation from somebody influential? 
• In some places it is customary to offer presents to service providers as a way to show gratitude for the services ren-
dered and in appreciation for their effort. Is this something that is valued in this community?
Topic 4: How is corruption understood?
Ask participants to define corruption. 
• What makes the difference between a corrupt action and other types of actions? Have them give examples. 
• Is corruption an intrinsically wrong behaviour, or is it mainly wrong because it impacts accessibility of essential ser-
vices? Is it wrong but somehow justified? Are there examples of cases where corruption is permissible? 
9.3 Annex 3: Sample semi-structured interview questionnaire: state 
authorities
Methodological notes 
This template is meant only to provide guidance to the researcher on the types of questions that may fruitfully comple-
ment the information collected through the other research activities. For illustrative purposes, it has been designed as an 
interview questionnaire for decision makers in the health sector. 
The interview questionnaire may be shared with the prospective interviewee in advance. It should begin with a paragraph 
describing the project and the reason why the interviewee’s expertise is expected to contribute valuable insights to in-
form the study. If the questionnaire is not shared beforehand, then a project information sheet should be handed out 
and discussed before beginning of the interview. In both cases a separate informed consent form should be provided. 
Suggested questions
1. Please describe, from your position in the health sector, what are the biggest challenges and strengths in the (coun-
try or region) health system?
2. Are there specific groups among the population that in your experience face significant barriers in accessing health 
services and why? 
3. What is your perception of the level of patient satisfaction with the quality of services provided in the health system?
4. Please describe the complaints and feedback mechanisms that are currently available to patients. And how do you 
perceive the effectiveness of (main complaints mechanism)? Do you think there is the need for additional (capacity 
building/strengthening) of the complaints management system?
5. What is the experience with patients’ use of the complaints and feedback mechanisms? 
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6. How frequently are they used? 
7. Do citizens use other means to express and communicate complaints?
8. What would you suggest as a means to improve communication between health sector officials, service providers 
and citizens, especially for handling complaints?
9. In your opinion, what would be effective ways to provide incentives for doctors and medical personnel to improve 
their performance?
10. Please describe how you view the role of unions in the health sector in enhancing (or impeding) performance of ser-
vice providers.
11. Please describe the current accountability mechanisms in place in the health system and your perception of their 
effectiveness.
12. Do you think there are adequate mechanisms currently in place for decision makers in the health sector to evaluate 
performance?
13. In the current situation, are the promotion criteria for health workers in any way linked to performance?
14. Similarly, are remuneration criteria for health workers in any way linked to performance?
15. In recent perception surveys on corruption, the health sector is perceived, among others, as one of the sectors with 
highest corruption risks. What is your opinion about that? If you think there are corruption risks what would those be 
and how may they best be addressed?
16. In your opinion, how could citizens’ inputs be best collected and processed in support of anti-corruption efforts in 
the health sector?
17. The following social accountability approach is currently being piloted (name of the program). It involves (description 
of the elements and processes). How would you evaluate this scheme’s likely effectiveness and what suggestions 
would you have for improving it?
9.4 Annex 4: Template for informed consent form for focus group 
discussion participants 
Introduction 
My name is ………………………….…... and I am a researcher from (description of researcher’s background and institutional 
affiliation). In collaboration with (names of partner institutions) we are undertaking a research project to support commu-
nities’ actions that can improve access to basic public services. Today we are contacting community members of (name 
of the community) to participate in a focus group discussion. We want to learn about the way people in your community 
organize to find solutions to their problems and about the typical experiences community members have when accessing 
public services. 
Purpose of the assessment
The focus group discussion is meant to help us better understand how things function in the community to support par-
ticipatory activities for improving public services in a manner that takes directly into account the circumstances of the 
people who will be undertaking them.
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Type of Participation
This assessment invites your participation in a (estimated duration) group discussion.
Participant Selection 
You are being invited to take part in this research because as an inhabitant of (name of the community) and (add other 
selection criteria if appropriate) you are qualified to give important insights in this topic. 
Voluntary Participation 
Your participation in this research is entirely voluntary. It is your choice whether to participate or not. The choice that you 
make will have no bearing on your job or on any work-related evaluations or reports. You may change your mind later and 
stop participating even if you agreed earlier.
Sharing the Results 
We want to assure you of the strict confidentiality of this discussion. Nothing that you tell us today will be attributable to 
you by name or position. The knowledge that we get from this discussion will be used to inform our study by bringing in 
the perspectives, thoughts, experiences and suggestions of citizens of ……… to help develop participatory mechanisms 
that are appropriate for your community.
Do you have questions for me please? 
Certificate of Consent 
I have read the foregoing information, or it has been read to me. I have had the opportunity to ask questions about it and any 
questions I have been asked have been answered to my satisfaction. I consent voluntarily to be a participant in this study. 
Name of Participant          
Signature of Participant  
Date (Day/month/year)  
Statement by the researcher/person taking consent
I have accurately read out the information sheet to the potential participant, and to the best of my ability made sure that 
the participant understands what his/her participation in this project will involve. I confirm that the participant was given 
an opportunity to ask questions about the study, and all the questions asked by the participant have been answered cor-
rectly and to the best of my ability. I confirm that the individual has not been coerced into giving consent, and the consent 
has been given freely and voluntarily.  A copy of this ICF has been provided to the participant.
Name of person taking the consent                                               
Signature of person taking the consent                
Date (Day/month/year)                                                           
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9.5 Annex 5: Data consolidation matrix 11
Components of the social accountability (SA) intervention10 Yes No Observations
Does the SA initiative include actions to make available information on citizens’ 
rights and entitlements?
Are citizen users involved to some extent in the aggregation/articulation of infor-
mation generated by the SA initiative?
If not, is the actor/agency tasked with the aggregation/articulation of information 
trusted by community members?
Are there established mechanisms to transmit the information generated through 
the SA initiative to relevant decision makers?
Are financial and/or career promotion incentives of service providers in any way 
linked to the SA assessment?
Are there any feedback mechanisms to inform citizens of the manner in which 
their inputs have been processed? 
Summary sample characteristics
Gender 
◻ Male     ◻ Female 
Age
◻ 15-25     ◻ 26-35     ◻ 36-45     ◻ 46-55     ◻ 56-65     ◻ 66+ 
Education level
◻ Primary     ◻ High School     ◻ College     ◻ Graduate     ◻ None 
10 Taking note of responses to survey question 5 validate that the social accountability intervention targets an area that is considered of the highest impor-
tance to community members themselves.
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Indicators of citizen attitudes vis-à-vis public officials/ 
service providers
Cooperative: Em-
powerment, Trust, 
Motivation
Disrupted: Vulner- 
ability, Mistrust, 
Apathy
Observations
What is the disposition of most citizens towards the viability of 
achieving improvements to services through citizens’ actions?¹¹
Do citizens expect to receive appropriate treatment on the 
basis of their rights and entitlements or rather as a function 
of their ability to pay/provide a “gift”?¹²
Do citizens expect to receive appropriate treatment on the 
basis of their rights and entitlements or rather as a function 
of their personal connections?¹³
Do citizens expect to receive appropriate treatment on the 
basis of their rights and entitlements or rather as a function 
of their proactive support of the government?14
Are citizens generally aware of their rights and entitlements?*
How do most respondents characterize their feelings vis-à-vis 
service providers?*
Do citizens trust state officials’ disposition to act to promote 
the welfare of their communities?15
Do citizens fear services may be taken away from them if they 
denounce bad service?*
Do citizens fear other types of reprisals from denouncing bad 
service?*
Are some groups better treated than others by providers of 
public services?*
12 13 14 151617
11 Enter responses to survey question 21 (sum of responses a) and c) coded under cooperative and sum of responses b) and d) coded under disrupted.
12 Enter responses to survey question 13
13 Enter responses to survey question 14
14 Enter responses to survey question 17
15 Enter responses to survey question 18 c) and d)
* Tick the appropriate response (associated with the features of cooperative or disrupted relations) on the basis the majority of responses obtained through  
the Focus Group Discussions.
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Community collective action capabilities
Example of summary figure institutional trust1618
Figure 9.1: Trust in institutions
16 This figure is generated on the basis of responses to survey question 6
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Participation in different types of 
organizations 
4% 
3% 
9% 
1% 
1% 
17% 
22% 
1% 0% 
4% 
38% 
International, bilateral actor organized/
sponsored 
Political groups 
Organized by NGOs 
Based on economic motives 
Faith based 
Charitable organizations 
Leisure 
Self help 
Women's 
Others 
No participation 
Example of Summary Graph on Participatory Activity1719
Figure 9.2: Participation in different types of organizations
17 This graph is generated on the basis of responses to question 19
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Yes No Observations
Evidence on existence of horizontal 
networks18
Traditional/communitarian Modern/Individualistic
Predominant set of values prevailing in the com-
munity19
Range of 1-6 where 1= weakly adhered to and 
6= strongly adhered to
Communitarian Individualistic
Predominant pattern of social interactions20 ⁰
World citizen Local community Nation Autonomous 
individua
Self-assessment of primary group ascription21 
Range of 1-4 where 1=strongly self-identifies
4=does not self-identify
Yes No Observations
Are there observed instances of actual coop-
erative interactions between public official and 
citizens?22
Are there formal or informal mechanisms in 
place to enable communication between citi-
zens and public officials?23
20 21 22  23 24 25
18 Tick yes or no based on responses obtained in Focus Group Discussions
19 Code survey question 16 as follows: questions c. e. g. and h. represent traditional/communitarian values and questions a. b. d. and f. represent modern/
individualistic values. Sum numerical values of responses and calculate averages.
20 Tick the appropriate response on the basis of the responses obtained through the Focus Group Discussions.
21 Based on responses to survey question 20, sum numerical values of responses and calculate average value.
22 Tick the appropriate response on the basis of the responses obtained through the Focus Group Discussions and interviews.
23 Tick the appropriate response on the basis of the responses obtained through the Focus Group Discussions and interviews.
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Figure 9.2: Importance of social norms
Indicators of service providers attitudes and incentives24 26 
Yes No
Are financial incentives for service 
providers in any way linked to perfor-
mance? 
Are career promotion incentives for 
service providers in any way linked to 
performance? 
Are there adequate performance moni-
toring mechanisms in place for the ser-
vice providers?
24 Fill out according to responses obtained during interviews and information from desk review
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Are there clearly stipulated sanctions 
for corrupt acts of the part of service 
providers?  
Are sanctions for corrupt acts consis-
tently enforced? 
Are local government officials elected 
democratically?
Strategies employed by citizens to obtain public services
Yes No Observations
Are citizens aware of complaints mechanisms associated to provision 
of public services?25
27
Summary Figure26: Strategies for problem solving 28
25 Enter responses from survey question 12 (as percentages for affirmative and negative)
26 This figure is generated on the basis of responses to survey question 8
Strategies for problem solving 
21.84% 
9.20% 
24.14% 
8.05% 
2.30% 
14.94% 
17.24% 
2.30% 
1. Ask for intervention from a friend 
2. Ask for intervention from a relative 
3. Ask for intervention from an important person 
4. Pay a fee 
5. Give a small gift 
6. Denounce the disservice to the competent authorities 
7. Try several times until he/she gets a good result 
8. Avoid in general dealing with that institution 
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Summary Figure27: Preferred problem solvers 29
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.6: Ability to obtain service on your own
27 This figure is generated on the basis of the responses to survey question 7
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Happens all the time Happens sometimes Seldom happens Never happens
Perceptions of prevalence of 
corruption28
80% 15% 3% 2%
Significant impact Some impact Little impact No Impact
Perceptions of impact of cor-
ruption29
62 30% 4% 3%
30 31
28 Enter responses from survey question 9
29 Enter responses from survey question 10
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11. List of Acronyms
BULHON  Project Bayaniham Undertaking a Healthy and Organized Neighbourhood
CBOs   Community Based Organizations
CSC   Community Score Card
CSO   Civil Society Organization
FA   Farmers’ Association
FGD   Focus Group Discussion
GII-SA   Ghana Integrity Initiative Social Accountability Project
GHS   Ghana Health Service
LGU   Local Government Unit
MAO   Municipal Agriculture Office
NHIS   National Health Insurance Scheme
PACDE   UNDP Global Programme on Anti Corruption
SA   Social Accountability
ZTCHSS   Project “Zero Tolerance for Corruption in the Health Sector in Serbia”
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Abstract
This practitioners’ handbook provides the required tools for contextualising social accountability initiatives aimed at 
empowering citizens to engage in anti-corruption actions. The material herein contained has been developed through 
a collaborative effort with UNDP and reflects the findings from academic research conducted in the scope of the ANTI-
CORRP research consortium (anticorrp.eu). The handbook presents an analytical framework through which the critical 
dimensions involved in developing successful anti-corruption social accountability initiatives are identified. It also in-
cludes concrete research tools that may be applied in order to obtain key information about the communities intended 
to engage in anti-corruption actions and guidelines to aid implementers in designing participatory schemes that best 
meet the characteristics of the local context.
